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INDEX.
ABATEMENT.
I. When the party seeking a divorce appeals from a judgment denying it,
and pending the appeal either party dies, theappeal and the action abate abso.
lutely. Dot'ner v. Howrard, 667.
2. But where the judgment grants a divorce, or determines either way an
issue a to the ralidty of a marriage. the appeal may be revived for the purpose
of protecting persons whose property interests were affected by the judg-
ment. iii.
ACCOMPLICE. See CRIMINAL LAw, 2-4 ; WITNESS.
ACTION. See ARBITRATION, 3; )EBTOR AND CREDITOR. 11 ; DECEIT, I;
INFANT, I ; JURISDICTION, 1-2 ; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 1-3; STATUTE,
2; STREET; SUNDAY.
I. The mere fact that the breach of a public statutory duty has caused
damage does not vest a right of action in the person suffering the damage
against the person guilty of the breach ; -whether the breach does or does not
give such right of action must depend upon the object cad language of the
particular statute. Atkin on v. Vewcasele and (Gate.lhead lWatencorks Co., 59.
2. When a plaintiff's cause of action arises from a violation of law on his
part, his suit cannot he sustained. Smith v. Rollins, 129.
3. The violation of a duty imposed by a municipal ordinance, and sanc-
tioned by a fine, will not support an action on the case for special damages
in favor of one injured by the violation and against the violator. Ieeney v.
Sprague, 129.
4. The plaintiff contracted with the defendants to play first old man and
character business fur thirty-six weeks. At the close of the nineteenth week,
the defendants discharged the plaintiff without fault on his part, who com-
menced an action for breach of the contract during the next week. ldd,
that the action was not premature. ,ittherland v, y|er, 335.
5. Actions brought on executory contracts before the time of fulfilment
discussed. A'ore to Berrq v. Carler, 490.
6. A cause of action founded upon an implied contract may be the subject
of set-off. Ilhnson v. Linlseg, 733.
7. Whenever one person commits a tort against the estate of another with
the intention of Ibenefiting his own estate, the law will imply a contract on
the part of the wrongdoer to pay to the party injured the full value of all
benefits resulting to auch wrongdoer. But where one person commits a tort
against another, and his own estate is not thereby benefited, the law will not
imply or presume a contract on the part of such wrongdoer to pay for the
resultitig damages. I. See Assu.MPSIT. 5.
8. As a general rule an action on a contract must he brought in the name
of the party having the legal interest therein. Kow-tz 2. Hlthilouse, 734.
9. A third party may maintain an action in his own name upon a contract
made expressly for his benefit, where his release woull he a sufficient dis-
charge to the promisor, but not where it would leave the pronisor liable to
an action by the other contracting party. Id.
10. The rule that if one party pay money to another for the use of a third
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person, an action lies by the person beneficially interested, does not apply
where the contract is for the benefit of the contracting party, and the thir,1
person is a stranger in the -contract and consideration ; the action then mu-t
be by the promisee. Guthrie v. Ker, 734.
11. Where the contract leaves the promisor subject to a suit bv the pro-
misce, and likewise to a third person beneficially interested, the latter cannot
maintain an action. Id.
12. A legatee cannot maintain a common law proceeding against the
debtor of his testator's estate. Id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1780, May 26. See YOREIGN JUDGMENT, 2.
1834, June 30. See OFFICE.
1836, July 4. See PATENT.
1862, June 2. See UNITED STATES.
1862, July 17. See CONFISCATION.
1864, Julie - See TAXATION.
1866, April 9. See IIUSBAND AND WIFE, 10.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 639. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Sect. 905. See FOREIGN JUVDGMENT, 1.
Sect. 1005. See UNITED STATES COURTS.
Sect. 1079. See WITNESS.
Sect. 5440. See CRIMINAL LAW, 29.
1875, March 3. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY. See SHIPPING.
I. Collision.
1. Vessels in motion are required to keep out of the way of a vessel at
anchor. Steam-tuy Ehrman, 400.
2. A ship and a bark were both on the port tack. The bark was the wind-
ward vessel, and had the wind three points free. The ship was close hauled,
and when first sighted by the bark was approaching her on her lee beam.
Held, that the ships were crossing each other, and that it was the duty of the
bark, being the windward vessel, to get out of the way of the other. The
Pecforton Castle, 594.
II. Liabilli,/ of Ship Owners. See infra, 10 ; SHIPPING.
3. Both a tug and its tow are liable for the consequences of a collision,
when those in charge of the respective vessels jointly participate in their con-
trol, and the master or crew of both vessels are guilty of negligence in their
navigation. Steam-tug Virginia Ehrman, 400.
4. Ship-owners, if their ship is without fault, are entitled in a cause of
collision, except where it occurs from inevitable accident, to full compensa-
tion for the damage their ship receives, provided it does not exceed the value
of the offending vessel and her freight then pending. Id.
III. .Mlaritine Liem.
5. A contract for the use of a wharf by the master of a vessel is a mari-
time contract, and as such cognizable in admiralty. Ex parte Easton, 423.
6. Such a contract, if the vessel is a foreign onq, or belongs to a port of
another state, gives rise to a maritime lien against the vessel, enforceable by
a proceeding in rent or by a suit in personana against the owner. Id.
7. Nature of maritime lien discussed. I., Note.
8. While there is no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue
a writ of proltihition to the District Court, when proceeding as a court of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction, yet tie facts'upon which the court is to act
must appear in the record. Id.
IV. Salraqe.
9. A steam-tu, having a vessel in tow, saw a ship ashore and went out of
her way to inform, and informed, another steam-tug of what she had seen.
INDEX.
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The other steam-tug thereupon proceeded to the stranded ship and towed her
into safety. In an action of salvage instituted on behalf of both steam-tugs
against the ship, held, that the owners, master and crews of both steam-tugs
were ehtitlcd to salvage remuneration. The &irah, 792.
10. Ship-owners are not liable for life salvage in cases where no property
belonging to them has been saved.. Cargo (x Surlnedon, 792.
AGENT. See Bnoxs.n, 1 ; CoWt.Mo. CARRIER, 10; EVIDENCE, 5 ; OFFICrR, 2.
1. A general power to borrow money includes authority to givl to tile lender
the ordinary securities for the sum borrowed. llatc! v. Coddington, 60.
2. Persons who deal with an agent before notice of the recall of his pow-
ers are not affected by the recall. Id.
3. No company can be allowed to hold out another as its agent and then
disavow responsibility for his acts. After it has appointed an agent in a par-
ticular business, parties dealing with him on that business have a.right to rely
upon the continuance of his authority, until in some way informed of its re-
vocation. Southern Lif. Ins. Co. v. AfcCain, 401.
4. An agreement for the purchase of realty was made between E. of the
first part, and D., "in behalf of the city of Providence," of the second
part. It was signed by the pariies in their own names and sealed -with their
owvn seals. On demurrer, ]. Id, that the contract was that of D. personally,
and not that of the city. City of Proridence v. Miller, 130.
5. An agent authorized to sell goods on commission has no implied power
to barter or exchange them, or to pledge them for his bwn debt. Wf'heeler &
Wilsoa Manifacturinq Co. v. Gian, 272. See TROVER, 2.
6. In suit upon a note given for the purchase-money of a sewing-machine
bought of plaintiff's agent, it is no defence that the maker has furnished
board to the agent in payment of the note unider an agreement made at the
time of the sale, where it appears that the maker had notice that the agent
was not authorized to make such agreement and the plaintiff never consented
to it. Id.
7. A person intrusted with merchandise simply as an agent, for the sale*
thereof, cannot dispose of it by barter to one who knows the goods bartered'
for to lie for the agent's own use. Victor Newintq Mtachine Co. v. Heller, 734.
8. Mere possession of chattels by an agent cannot empower him to admit
away tie title of his principal. Ilfchiqlan Machine Co. v. Parcell, 734.
9. A principal must disavow the acts of his agents within a reasonable
time, otherwise he is held to have ratified it. Umon (6old Mining Co. v.
Rocky .lfounta, Mihtional Bank, 400.
10. Where a draft purported to be drawn ia the name of the firm by D.
.1l. Brock as their agent, and on the trial it appeared to have been drawn by
D. WV. Brock: field, that the variance was immaterial. MAfcDonough v. ]e-
man, 668.
11. Where an agent's authority to bind defendants by a draft is in ques-
tion, it is proper, in connection with proof of his having previously drawn a
similar draft to the same order, ivhich had been paid, to ask the payee what
the agent said to hint at'the time the first draft was drawn as to his authority
to draw in defendants' names. This is adimissible to show that in drawing
both drafts the agent acted in the same capacity. d.
12. If parties in whose names a draft is drawn appropriate and enjoy the
fruits of the same, with full knowledge of the transaction, they thereby ratil)
the act of the person drawing it, though previously unauthorized, Id.
13. It seins, that if the agent of an express company receives goods con-
signed to him as such for delivery to the purchaser, and having in his hands
for collection at the same time a bill for the price of such goods, delivers them
to the purchaser, the company becomes liable to the conpignor, whether the
agent in fact collects the bill or not. Wells v. Anmerican Erpress Go., 668.
14. Where goods are not delivered to an express company, but are sent by
railvay to their place of destination, consigned to the purchaser in tie care
of the express company's agent at that place, and never come into his pos-
session, but are delivered by the railway company directly to the purchaser,
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without fault of the express company or its agent, and a bill of such goods,
sent also tb such agent for collection, not being paid by the purchaser. ik
promptly returned by the agent, no liability of the express company to the
consignor is created by these facts. Id.
ALIMONY. See IIUSBAND AND WI E, 5, 6.
ALLEY. See EASEMENT, 1 ; MuNICIPAL CORPORATION, 14, 15.
ANCIENT LIGHT. Sec EAsEM NT, 2-4.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
1. Where a person owes another several distinct debts, he has the right to
choose which debt he will pay first ; and the creditor is bound to appropriate
it as directed by the debtor. Sttwart v. Hopktz,,, 594.
2. The creditor cannot divert a payment, so made by his debtor, from the
appropriation made by him, upon mere equitable considerations that do not
amount to an agreement, thoughs mere equitable considerations may control
where the payment is made without designating its application. hd.
3. To make applicable the rule that in the absence of a specific appropria-
tion of payments by either the debtor ow- creditor, the law will appropriate
them, there must be some testimony tending to show that no such appropria-
tion has been made by the parties. Albert v. Lindau, 401.
ARBITRATION.
1. Where several persons enter into a written contract, stipulating that
each shall keep up his own cattle, and prevent the same from trespassing
upon the crops or hedges of any of the others, and that in ca-e any injury
should occur by reason of the cattle of any one of the said persons trespass-
ing upon the crops or hedges of any of the others, and the parties themselves
could not agree upon the amount of the damages sustained, then that the ques-
tion as to the amount of such- damages should be submitted to arbitrators,
consisting of three of the signers to said contract ; and that the decision of
such arbitrators should be final between the parties : 1dd, that such contract
is valid and binding. Berry v. Carkr, 486.
2. Where one of the parties refuses to recognise the validity of such a con-
tract, the other may immediately commence an action for the amount of such
damages. d.
3. Effect of agreement to arbitrate on right of action in the courts. Id.,
Note 490.
4. Revocability of reference before award discussed. Id., Note 491.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See CRxIMINA LAw, IL
Provocation of an assault, though not sufficient for justification, may go
to exclude exemplary damages. Brown v. Swilneford. 670.
ASSIGNMENT. See CONTRACT: 15, 16 ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, I ; lNSU-
IRANCE, 18; TRovER, 1.
1. The assignment of a judgment or other like chose in action, where the
'legal title does not vest in the assignee, can only be perfected as against the
debtor or his creditors by notice given to them that such assignment has been
made. Fickey v. Loney, 50.
2. This rule does not apply where notes have been actually delivered. Id.
3. If the possession is not changed, and apparent ownership still with the
assignor, so that he is enabled to hold himself out as owner of the paper, and
if the debtor pay in good faith to the assignor thus in possession, lie will be
protected. Id.
ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION.
1. A plaintiff may recover as upon an implied quantumn meruit, for the value
of services rendered under a special contract, which has been wrongfully ter-
minated by the defendant. Ralston v. Administrator of Kohl, 194.
2. Where an item of account oni which suit is brought is not proved on the
trial to the full extent claimed in the petition, but the variance between the
allegations and the proof is not such as to mislead the defendant in regard to
INDEX.
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the nature and character of the claim in controversy, such variance will not
prevent a recovery, it the faet4 proved show a good cause of action. Id.
3. In order to raise an inlplied contract to pay fir labor, it is not neces-
sary that there shall have been, an intention on the part of the laborer during
his service to charge therefor ; it i- sufficient that the one for whom the labor
is done expected to pay for it. 11ty v. ll' edrc, 335.
4. In an action brought against a city by its mayor, to recover the costs
taxed by him in his own favor in certain cases against persons charged with
violating tile ordinances of the cit%, in which cases such persons wer, fined,
and in default of paynlcnt were sentenced to hard labor in the city prison,
until such labor, at a stipulated rate, would amount to a sum equal to the
fine and costs in such ca-es, and the persons were put to work in the city
prison, and perfortmed the rtquired labor for the benefit of the city :Held,
that this did not constitute a collection and appropriation by the city of tite
costs taxed in favor of tile mayor in such cases, from which tile law will im-
ply a promise on the part of tile city to, pay the amount of such costs to the
mayor. Gibson v. (Gty ,oI Z,eu.'cille, 531.
5. Assumpqit docs not lie for the value of personal property taken by a
trespasser and applied to his own use. The law implies no promise under
such circumstance,. Toba v. Ilogebooma, 734. See ACTION, 7.
ATTACHMENT. Sec Bl.tsttt:Prcy, 1, 2; CONFLICT or LAWS, !.
I. Where two several creditors simultanCously attach a debtor's real
estate, consisting of an equity of redemption, as between themselves an undi-
vided half thereof becomes holden as attached on each writ, and the equity
may be sold in moieties upon executions recovered upon such writs, one undi-
vided half upon each execution, where neither moiety is sold upon the exe-
cution for a sum exceeding the amount due thereon. True v. Enery, 156.
2. Where an officer in his return of a sale of an equity upon execution
declares that he published in a certain ne.wspaper the notice which the statute
requires to be given, it is not competent for the debtor, or any one claiming
under him, to contradict the officer's return by the production of such news-
paper, showing tite return to be untrue. Id.
3. Process of garnishment cannot be made to operate so as to annul the
contracts of parties. McPherson v. Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Co., 672.
4. A garnishee proceeding is discontinued by plaintiff's failure to appear
on return of a summons to show cause. Jtohnson v. Dexter, 738.
5. A judgment against the garnishees upon their voluntary appearance to
a second summons issued after such discontinuance, does not bar a recovery
against them on a previous assignment from their creditor. Id.
ATTORNEY. See CitAMPERTY; CONTRACT, 7; ESTOPPEL, 2; WITNESS.
1. All communications which an attorney is precluded by statute from dis-
closing. his client cannot be compelled to disclose against his objection of
privilege. State v. Ihdte, 131.
2. Communications made to an attorney in the course of a professional
consultation, which do 'not relate to the subject-matter of the consultation,
are not privileged. Btate v. fewhorter, 531.
3. Where an attorney has received money which he is to hold until the
question of its ownership shall, be determined between the parties, he cannot
in a proceeding of garnishment refuse to state where he has deposited the
money, on the ground that his knowledge of the matter is privileged. lVil-
lanis Brothers v. Youo!!, 531.
4. The authority of an attorney who has obtained a judgment for his client
continues in force until the judgment is satisfied. W hite v. Johnson, 335.
5. Payment to the attorney is payment to his client. Id.
6. Returning an execution to the creditor's attorney of record, at the lat-
ter's request, will protect the officer against a suit by the creditor for not
returning it into tile clerk's office. Id.
7. To constitute a revocation of the attorney's authority, notice must be
given. The opposite party has a right to presume that his authority con-
tinues until notified to the contrary. Id.
INDEX.
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8. The substitution of one attorney for another in a cause is not complete
until notice of his substitution has been served upon the attorney of tbc oppo-
site party. (ontArt v. tockbridge, 402.
9. An attorney who refuses to pay over money belonging to his client will
be ordered to do so on motion of the client. Orr v. Trenner, 759.
10. Control of courts over their attorneys to enforce the payment to clients
of money collected for them, discussed. Id., Note 760.
BAIL. See SuRETY, 8.
BAILMENT. See IEGLIGENCE.
1. On the deposit of articles .in the cloak-room at a railway station, a
charge was made of 24. for each, and the depositor received a ticket, on the
back of which there was a notice that the company would not be responsible
for any package exceeding 10lt in value. A placard upon which was printed,
in legible characters, the same condition, uas also hung tip in the cloak-
room. The plaintiff deposited his bag, of value exceeding 101., in the defend-
ant's cloak-room, paid 2-1., and received a ticket. The bag was lost or .-tolen.
In an action to recover it- value, Hld, that plaintiff was under no obligation
to read the condition. J,irker v. 71e ,autheastern Railway Co., 60.
2. Property bailed to be manufactured comes within the class lo, a io operis
faciendi. Arnott v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co., 471.
3. The question of bailment is determined by the fact of whether the iden-
tical article delivered to a manufacturer is to be returned. Loflin 6- Pwnd 'ow-
der Co. v. Burkhardt, 532.
4. Possession is of the essence of a pledge, both at common and civil law.
Casey v. Cavaroe, 532.
5. The pledgor may have the tempgrary possession of the pledge, as special
bailee, without defeating the legal possession of the pledgee ; but where the
thing pledged has never been out of the plcdgor's actual possession, but has
always been subject to his disposal, no pledge or privilege exists as to third
persons. Id.
BANK AND BANKER. See CuECK, 2 ; SAVINGS BANK.
A suspension of specie payments by a bank is a failure of such bank. God-
frey v. Terry, 793.
BANKRUPTCY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 26, 27.
I. Effect of Proceedings.
1. An attachment of the property of a debtor on mesne process is ipsofacto
dissolved by a deed of assignment made in bankruptcy, if the proceedings in
bankruptcy were commenced within four months after such attachment. Ic-
Cord v. ]cXYal, 52.
2. In such a case the assignee's right is superior to the right of the attach-
ing creditor, although the attached property had been sold before the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the proceeds paid over to the
creditor after the adjudication, but prior to the date of the deed of assign-
ment. Id.
3. Effect of the Bankrupt Act on state insolvent laws discussed. Xote to
Burrill v. Hener, 372.
T. Preferences.
t. It is not enough that a creditor has some cause to suspect the insolvency
(,f his debtor, but he must have such a knowledge of facts as to induce a rea-
sonable belief of his debtor's insolvency, in order to invalidate a security
taken for his debt. Grant v. National Bank, 793.
III. Assignee. See TRADEMARK, 5.
5. An assignee in bankruptcy may sue in a state court to collect the assets.
Mcllenry v. La Soeijte Francais, 60.
6. If an assignee in bankruptcy submits himself to the jurisdiction of a
state court, in , suit affecting the estate which was pending when the pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy were commenced, he is bound by any judgment that
may be rendered. Id.
INDEX.
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7. TIe a-signce is not required to take measures for the sale of mortgaged
property unles its value is greater than tie encumlrance. lis duties relate
chiefly to unsecured creditors, and lie need not trouble himself about encum-
bercd property unless something may be realized out of it on their account. I.
IV. Disrlarge.
8. A discharge in bankruptcy when pleaded in bar to an action for prior
indebtedness, cannot be impeached in a state court, notwithstanding the bank-
rupt purposely omitted the indebtedness sued upon from the schedules, and
oinitted giving the creditor notice of the pendency of the proceedings. Brown
v. Kroh, 669.
33ILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See TRIAL.
1. There is but one mode of bringing upon the rec.ord the rulings of a
judge, and that is by a bill of exceptions allowed and sealed or signed by the
judge. PIircii Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 61.
2. The judge's notes do not constitute a bill of exceptions. They are but
memoranda from which a formal bill may afterwards be drawn up and
sealed. Id.
3. A bill of exceptions can be settled and allowed only by the judge, and
when it receives his signature it should lie complete uni -nothing left to 1e
settled by the agreement, rcollection or judgment of counsel, clerk or other
person. Atclison 4- N ebraak Radh'oad Co. v. Vagner, 180.
4. When skeleton bill allowed, Id.
5. A party excepting must point out specifically the part or proposition of
time charge excepted to. P., I. IV. 4- C Railway v. Probst, 195.
6. An exception in gross to time refusal to charge on a series of proposi-
tions will not be sustained when any of the propositions are unsound. 11.
7. In criminal as in civil eases, the bill of exceptions must be made up and
signed at the term at which the trial takes place. Eason v. State, 313.
BILL OF LADING. See SHIPPING.
BILL OF REVIEW. See PLEADING, 1.
BILLS ANI) NOTES. See AGENT, 6, 11-13; ASSIGNMENT, 2, 3; CsEcsc;
CoRPOmRATION, 19; EQUITY, 9, 30; EVIDENCE, 5,6; GUARANTY, 2, 3; HUs-
BAND AND WIFE, 35; JUDGMENT, 10; PARTNERSHIP; TENDER.
I. Form, considernli,,a, etc.
1. A note given for the discontinuance of a criminal prosecution is void..
A note is equally void, whether given as imartial or exclusive consideration,
for the discontinuance by the prosecuting attorney of criminal proceedings.
Wisner v. Bordrn l, 669.
2. The Act of Ohio tanking it a penal offence to take a "promissory note
or other negotiable instrument," not containing the words "given for a
patent right," knowing the consideration thereof to be a patented invention,
does not include in such offence the taking of notes not negotiable. State V.
Brower, 196.
II. Rigqts of parties. See injra, III.
3. If a party take a negotiable bill or note before maturity for considera-
tion and without ala tfiles, such party acquires a good title, notwithstanding
there may have been negligence. Nothing less than proof of knowledge of
facts that show the want of authority on the part of the person transferring
-the note will be sufficient for that purpose. Citizens' National Bank v.
Hvper, 532.
4. The plaintiff is not bound to make inquiry, and mere negligence, how-
ever gross, -not amounting to wilful and fraudulent blindness, while it would
be evidence of mala.fides, is not the same thing. Id.
5. O4 a suit by the holder of a bill of exchange against the drawer, who is
also the endorser, "no recovery can be had without proof of presentment to the
drawee. Thayer v. Peck, 336.
6. Where a note, payable to order and unendorsed, is accidentally destroyed
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by fire while in the possession of the payee, the payee can maintain an action
on such lost instrument without first giving a bond of indemnity. Mellei v.
Made, 735.
7. In an action by the endorsee against the endorser of a promissory note,
which was not presented to the maker for payment at maturity, the burden is
upon the plaintiff to show that the maker had then removed from the state,
or that due diligence was used to find him or ascertain his place of residence.
Eaton v. McMahon, 131.
ii. Endorsement, Arceptance, etc.
8. An acceptance by a partner in his own name of a bill of exchange
drawn upon the firm, binds the firm. 7Tohnan v. Jlanrahan, 735.
9. A party cannot recover in his own name on an unendorsed note paya-
ble to order by showing a verbal assignment from the payee to himself.
.obinson v. Wilkinson, 669.
10. Where a promissory note made payable to a particular person or order
is first endorsed by a third person, such third person is held to be an original
promisor, guarantor or endorser, according to the nature of the transaction
and the understanding of the parties at the time the transaction took place.
Good v. Martin, 3.
11. If he put his name in blank on the back of the note at the time it was
made, and before it was endorsed by the payee, to give the maker credit with
the payee, or if he participated in the consideration of the note, he must he
considered as a joint maker of the note. Id.
12. If his endorsement was subsequent to the making of the note and to
the delivery of the same to take effect, and he put his name there at the
request of the maker, pursuant to a contract of the maker with the payee for
further indulgence or forbearance, lie can 6nly he held as guarantor, and he
is not liable without legal proof of consideration for the promise, unless it be
shown that he was connected with the inception of the note. Id.
13. If the note was intended for discount, and lie put his'name on theback
with the understanding of all the parties that his endorsement would be inop-
erative until the instrument was endorsed by the payee, lie is liable only as a
second endorser in the commercial sense, and as such is entitled to the privi-
leges which belong to such an endorser. Id.
14. A person so signing cannot in any case be a first endorser. ie may
be a second endorser, hut in the absence of any statement by him at the time
he is presumed to have signed as a joint maker or guarantor, according as he
signs at the making of the note or afterwards, and as he participates or not
in the original consideration. Id.
15. Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which he
signed, as they bear upon the foregoing rules. Id.
.16. The endorser cannot show a parol agreement that the same should be
without recourse. Eaton v. fcillauhon, 131.
17. Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the contract implied from
endorsement as to change a simple unqualified endorsement into an endorse-
ment without recourse. Doolittle v. F F.rry, 735.
18. The names of the payees appeared on the back of a note in the usual
position of the first endorser, about three inches from the left end, and that
of the defendant in the opposite direction, about tle same distance from the
right end of the note, so that the latter with: reference to the former may be
said to have been inverted. Reld, that this irregular endorsement did not
relieve the defendant of liability, as he could have recourse against the
payees. Arnot's Adm'r v. Syinonds, 735.
BOND. See SURETY, 3.
1. To justify the refol-mation of a bond assigned to a bonafide holder, for
a valuable consideration, it must be proved that the assignee ehad notice of
the error at the time of the assignment. Foster v. Kingsley, 336.
2. Generally the term bond implies an instrument under seal. Inhabitants
of Boothbay v. Giles, 793.
INDEX.
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3. The official bond required of a collector of taxes must be a sealed instru-
ment. m.
BOUNI)ARY. See I'ossEsslos, 3, 4.
1. A settlement acquiesced in, becomes binding, though not in fact correct.
S mith v. .I1'Ke:!l, 402.
2. Metes and bounds in thd description of premises control distances and
quantities when there is any inconsistency between them. vlforrow v. lfWhit-
ney, 336.
3. In determining disputed boundaries, original monuments will govern.
If none such can be found at the lot in dispute, more distant monuments may
be consulted, from which a survey may be made. Plys v. Biemeret, 735.
4. If no certain monuments can be found, long-continued occupancy and
acquiescence, and even reputation anl hearsay aq to boundaries, may have
weight. Id.
BROKER.
1. A broker has the right to retain out of the proceeds of a cargo sold by
him for an agent, brokerage due him by the agent for the sale of other car-
goes not belonging to the same principal. Barry v. Boning.er, 336.
2. Where a broker, employed to sell propert.- at a price satisfactory to his
principal, produces a party ready to make the purchase at a satisfactory price,
the latter cannot relieve himself from liability to the broker for a commis-
sion by a capricious refusal to consummate the sale,. Delapluine v. Turnley,
370.
CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Burns v. The State, 48 Ala. 195, overruled. Green v. The State, 468.
Corby v. Hill, 4 0. B. N. S. 556, approved. White v. France, 66.
Indermaur v. Dames, Law Rep. 1 0. P. 274 and 2 C. P. 311, approved.
White v. France, 66.
Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall.*32, followed. Ins. Co. v. Higginbo-
botham, 358.
Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, disapproved. Kerr v. Kingsbury, 638.
Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59, disapproved. Kerr v. Kingsbury, 638.
Railroad Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 208, re-affirmed. Bailway Co. v. String-
er, 764.
Thurtell v. Beaumont, 8 J. B. Moore 612, 1 Bing. 339, disapproved. Kane
v. Ins. Co. 293.
Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, reviewed and dissented from. Perry v.
Wheeler, 24.
CAVEAT EMPTOR. See JUDICIAL SALE, 3.
CHAMPERTY.
1. A contract between attorney and client that if anything is recovered the
attorney is to receive one half the amount obtained, after deducting expeases,
is void for champerty. Orr v. Tanner, 759.
2. In Missouri chajupertous contracts are void; but a contract between at-
torney and client is not champertous because the attorney agrees to receive,
as a compensation for his services, a portion of the property in controversy.
It is an essential element in s champertous contract, that he also agree to pay
some portion of the cost or expenses of the litigation. Duke v. Harper, 595.
3. A contract to pay a specific sum of money to a lawyer for his services
in a suit concerning real estate out of the proceeds of said land when sold by
the client, if recovered, is not champerty. 31cPherson v. Cox, 544.
4. Nor is it void under the Statute of Frauds because not in writing, for
it may be performed within the year. Id.
CHARITY.
1. A bequest to one in trust "for any and all benevolent purposes which
he may see fit" is void for uncertainty. Adge v. Smith, 132.
2. The statute of 43 Eliz., chap. 4, was never in force in Maryland. Ould
v. Washington hlospital for Foundlings, 196.
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3. The validity of charitable endowments and the jurisdiction of courts of
equity in such cases, however, in this country do not depend upon that sta-
tute. Ould v. 1Vashington Hospitalfjor Foundlings, 196.
4. A charitable use may be applied to almost anything that tends to pro-
inote the well-being of social man. Id.
5. A perpetuity is a limitation of property which renders it inalienable
beyond the period allowed by law. Id.
6. A devise to a corporation to be created by the legislature is good as an
executory devise. Id.
7. A misnomer of a corporation legatee will not defeat a bequest if suich
legatee can be identified. Goodell v. Union Association, 533.
8. A gift to "Trinity Church Sunday School in Mount Rolly, $1000 to be
safely invested, the interest to be applied to making Christmas presents to the
scholars of said school," is not a legal charity, and is void, also, for uncer-
tainty in not designating the kind of gifts, and because such distribution is
indiscriminate and devoid of all purpose. Ad.
CHARTER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 6-8, 11, 13; CORPORATION, 13, 16,
25; RAI.LROAD, 6.
CHARTER-PARTY. See SHIPPING.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, L
CHECK. See DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS; GIFT.
1. The rightful possession of a check, made payable to the order of a par-
ticular person, confers no authority on the drawee to pay the same to the per-
son having such possession, without the genuinq endorsement of the payee.
Dodge v. Natim.a . Exchange Bank, 196.
2. The duty of the drawee, upon acceptance of such cheek, to pay the same
only upon the genuine endorsement of the payee named therein, is not
affected by a custom among hankers as to the mode of ascertaining the iden-
tity of the person endorsing the name of the payee and receiving payment. Id.
3. Delay to present a bank check until the failure of the batik, ten days
after its receipt, held negligence which would have discharged the drawers if
they had left funds in the bank until that time to meet the check. Kinyon v.
Stanton, 669.
4. But where the drawers drew out their entire account in the bank before
its failure, they are liable to protect the check. Id.
CHOSE IN ACTION. See ASSIGNMENT, 1; CORPORATION, 17 ; INSURANCE,
17.
CHURCH. See COURTS, 1-4.
COLLISION. See ADMIRALTY; SHIPPING, 4.
COM1MON CARRIER. See BAILMENT, I. NEGLIGENCE.
1. The contract of a carrier of passengers, implied from the purchase of a
ticket, is to carry the purchaser safely as to his person and ordinary baggage.
Weeks v. N. Y., N. H. J" Uart ford Railroad Co., 506.
2. For injuries to his person or loss of his property of the foregoing kind,
by the negligence of the carrier, the latter is responsible in damages, although
the injury or loss occurred by the violence of third persons, not under the
carrier's control. Id. .
3. But where the passenger carries on his person property not included in
the class mentioned, and which, from its value, could not be expected to form
part of ordinary travelling baggage, the carrier is not liable for its loss,
even by forcible robbery allowed to take place by the carrier's negligence.
Id.
4. In a suit against a railroad company for damages resulting from delay
in the transit of freight, the company can show that the delay was caused
solely by the lawless, irresistible violence of men who were not in the em-
ployment of the railroad company. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne 6- Chicago Rail-
road Co. v. Htazen 273
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5. The liability of a carrier commenecs when the goods are delivered to,
an-! acet-pted by, him or his authorized agent for transportation. Pr atr v.
Grind Trank Rilua Co., 231.
6. If a common carrier agrees that property intended for transportation by
him may e deposited at a particular place, without express notice to him,
such depo-it amounts to notice'and is a delivery. Id.
7. The liability of the carrier is fixed by accepting the property to be
transported, and the acceptance is complete whenever the property thus comes
into his possession with his assent. Id.
8. If the deposit of goods is a mere accessory to the carriage, that is, if
they are deposited for the purpose of being carried, without further orders,
the responsibility of the carrier begins from the time they are received ; but
when they are subject to the further order of the owner, the case is other-
wiqe. Ill.
9. The plaintiff's intestate delivered to the defendant's agent at Castine $24.90,
to be forwarded to Belfast, and there delivered to one Basle, agent of the Con-
tinental Life Insurance Company. The money was sent for the purpose of
paying the intestate's seii-annual premium on his life-policy, which would
by its terms lapse if premium was not paid on or before eight days there-
after; of all which the defendant's agent had notice, but failed to deliver the
money. Hel. that primarily the defendants would be liable in damages for
the net value oW the policy on the day it lapsed, both parties having presum-
ably contemplated such damages from knowledge of the circumstances.
Grindle v. Eastern Express Co., 337.
10. Where the consignor of goods shipped by an express company instructs
the company not to permit the consignee to examine the goods before delivery
anl payment of charges, the agent of the company is authorized to refuse
snoh examination and incurs no personal liability by returning the goods to
the consignor. -Wiltse v. Barnes, 533.
I1. If the express compatty has a rule forbidding inspection of goods by
the consignee before delivery, it must tippear that the rule was brought to the
knowledge of the shipper to be binding upon the consignee. Id.
12. The carrier may limit its obligation to carry safely over its own lines,
or only to points reached by its own carriages, and for safe storage and de-
livery to the next carrier in the route beyond, although the goods are marked
to a point beyond its line. Erie Railroad Co. v. Wilcox, 273.
13. A railroad company may, by express contract, limit its liability in the
ca'riage of horses. Morrison v. Philiips Colby Construction Co., 670.
14. Possession by a shipper of a carrier's receipt for the property, ceon-
ttining special terms, is at least prima facie evidence of his assent to them,.
and in most cases may be conclusive. Id.
15. Defendant's custom was to carry horses at the owner's risk, and at
reduced rates for that reason; and the letters "0. R.," signifying "Ow n er's
Risk," were upon the receipt given plaintiff for his horses, and retained and
put in evidence by him ; and he testifies that he "did not see" those letters,
hut not that he did not -,nierstand their meaning. Held, that the restricted
liability of the company clearly appears from plaintiff's evidence. Id.
CONFISCATION.
The general pardon and .amnesty by President Johnson. by proclamation
of December 25th 1868, do' not entitle one receiving their benefits to the
proceeds of his property, previously condemned and sold under the Confisca:
tion Act of 1862, after such proceeds have been paid into the treasury of the
United States. Knote v. United States, 273.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See HusnAN AND WIFE, 14; SE-OaP: WILL, 9.
The plaintiff, a citizen of Rhode Island, attached-in Connecticut a debt
due from a resident of Connecticut, to a corporation located in Pennsylvania.
Previous to the attachment the corporation had gone into insolvency under
the insolvent laws of that state, and had under those laws made an assignment
of all its effects to a trustee for the benefit of its creditors, and notice of the
assignment had been given to the Connecticut debtor. Held, that the trustee
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in insolvency did not acquire a title to the debt that was good against the
attachment. Pe';ne v. Lester, 132.
CONSPIRACY. See CRIMINAL LAW, III.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See TAXATION, 1-3.
I. Powers of Congress. See CRIM1INAL LAW, 24.
1. The power vested in Congress to establish "post-offices and post-reads"
embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. l atter
of Jackson, 596.
2. Letters and sealed packages subject to lctter postage in the mail can
only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when
papers are subjected to search in one's own household. Id.
3. Regulations against the transportation in the mail of printed matter,
cannot be enforced so as to interfere with the freedom of the press. When,
therefore, printed matter is excluded from the mail, its transportation in any
other way cannot be forbidden by Congress. Id.
II. Powers of (he State Legislature. See CORPORATION, 11, 12 ; HUSBAND
AND WIFE, -- 10; STATUTE, 9-11.
4. The" township aid actV' of Missouri authorized subscriptions by town-
ships to the capital stock of railroad companies whenever two-thirds of the
qualified voters of the township, voting at an election called for that purpose,
should vote in favor of the subscription. The constitution of -the statq pro-
hibited such a subscription "unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of
the * * * town, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall
assent thereto." Held, that the assent required by the constitution was ob-
tained if two-thirds of those voting at the prescribed election should vote to
that effect; and that the said "township aid act" was constitutional. County
of Cass v. Johnson, 61.
5. All qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called
are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting,
unless the law providing for the election otherwise declares. Id.
6. A statute of a state which declares that all charters of corporations
granted after its passage may be amended or repealed by the legislature, does
not necessarily apply to supplements to a charter already passed, though the
supplement be subsequent to the statute. State v. Yard, 132.
7. Nor does a provision in a supplement to the charter, which says that
"this supplement, and the charter to which it is a supplement, may be altered
or amended by the legislature," apply to a contract with the company made
in a supplement passed long after. id.
8. Such reservations of the right to repeal found in statutes, are only bind-
ing on succeeding legislatures so far as they choose to adopt them. It is,
therefore, in every case a question whether the legislature making the contract
intended that the former provision for repeal or amendment should become a
part of the new contract by implication. Id.
9. In modes of proceeding to enforce a contract the legislature has the
control and may enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a
remedy or so embarrass itwith conditions as seriously to impair the value of
the right. State of Tennessee ex. rel. Bloomstein v. Sneed, 337.
10. The constitution of Alabama declared that corporations "shall not be
created by special act." An act of said state was passed authorizing the ,V.
V. Railroad Company (a pre-existing corporation) to purchase the railroad
and franchises of the Alabama Railroad Company (another pre-existing cor-
poration), and, after doing so, to change its own name to that of the Ala-
bama and Chattanooga Railroad Company : Held, that this act was not
unconstitutional, and that the above provision in the constitution could not be
construed to prohibit the legislature from changing the name of a corpora-
tion, or from giving it power to purchase additional property. Wallace v.
Loomis, 402.
11. The original charter of a company gave it the right, in consideration
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of lnti-ilin- a turnpike authorized thereby, and ol' keeping it in repair, to erect
certain coll-gates;, and to exact certain tolls lor the use of thle turnpike, until
tile expiration or twenrt-ive years I ruin thc date of the charter, and as much
longer a4 the state should ftil to redeem the franchises so granted by payingthe cot ot tile work : J1.i, hat this was undoubtedly a contract ; but it
relaed oily to the turnpike then authorized to be constructed. ,S7t. Clatir
County Tarnpike Co. v. TI, d P op/c, 472.
12. The regulation of the forms or administering justice by the courts is
an incident of sovereignty. The surrender of this power is never to be pre-
suned. Cauirn and FlIoi R tilroad Co. v. Hlecht, 197.
13. A statute, therefore, which prescribes a mode of service of judicial
proces.s upon a railroad company, different from tlitt provided for in its
charter, is valid. Pl.
14. When, however, it clearly appears to be the intention of the legislature
to limit its power of bringing the cotporation before its judicial tribunals to
the in ,le mentioned in the charter, subsequent legislation upon that subject
is invalid. Id.
15. The police power of a state cannot be exercised over a subject con-
fided excluively to Congress by the federal constitution: 11annibul and St.
Joseph Rri,.oad C. v. lusen, 164.
16. While a state may enact sanitary and quarantine laws, it cannot inter-
fere with irm portation into or through its borders, beyond what is abso-
lutely necesiary for iti self-protection. Rd.
17. A statute of a state which prohibits driving or conveying any Texas,
Mexican, or Indian cattle into the state between the first day of March and
the first day of December in each year, is unconstitutional. Id.18. The sale, by retail, of intoxicating liquors may be constitutionally
regulated by law, and in localities where the legislature is of the opinion that
the peace of society so requires, license to carry on the retail traflic may be
refused. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 533.
19. The question of license is one Properly of local police, and may be
regulated by lawfully constituted local agencies representing and acting for
the local public. Id.
III Taking7 private prnprrty. Eminent Domain. See DAMAGES, 1 ; TAXATION.
20. Whqa the ratification of all assessment of damages-of the landowner
vests in the city a right, at its will, to enter upon the land and possess it as a
street, suels a right constitutes a taking, within the sense of the constitutional
provision forbiddiinx the taking of private property for public use without
coin atiqation. Fink v. 34syor of Newark, 670.
21. Whtn land is so taken, provision must be made for the payment of
such damaes within a reasonable time. Id.
IV. P,)wrs of.T9adic;ary. See suprd, 12, 13.
22. When a htw has been passed and approved and certified in due form,
the courts cannot go behind the law to inquire into the observance of form in
its passage. Kilgore v. ll, qee, 736. See STATUTE, 12.
V. Trial by Tury ; Putting twice in jeopardy, etc.
23. Art. 7 of the amendments to tile Constitution of the United States,
relating to trials by jury, applies only to the courts of the United States.
Pearson v. Ywdall, 197.
24. An award of punitive damages for a tort which is also punishable as a
crime, is not in violation of the constitutional provision that no person for
the same offence shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment. Birown, v.
Swin.ford, 670.
CONTEMNPT.
1. The adjudication of contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction, where
the proceeding is according to the common law practice, is final and cannot
be reviewed by a court of error. Tyhr v. flam,.sl, 242.
2. But where the question of contempt is tried upon an issue of law ten-dered by the party moving in the proceeding, the decision must be regarded
as a judgment upon which a writ of error may be brought. d.
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CONTRACT. See ACTIoN, 4-11; ARBITRATION, I; CONSTITUTIONL LAW, 8,
9, 11 ; CORPORATION, 24; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1-4, 6; MORTGAGE, 4, 5;
SALE.
1. Verbal agreemenb between the parties'to a witten contract are in gen-
eral inadmissible to vary its terms or to affect its construction. But oral
agreements subsequently made on a new and valuable consideration and
before the breach of the contract, in cases not falling within the Statute of
Frauds, stand upon a different footing, as such agreements may have tile
effect to enlarge the time of performance, or may vary any other of its terms,
or may waive or discharge it altogether. HIawkins v. United States, 6.
. 2. Implied promises exist only when there is no express promise between
the parties. Ad.
3. When a contract for the delivery of stone exists only in parol; a subse-
quent verbal agreement varying the manner of delivery is binding. Walker
v. Jolmson, 537.
4. The plaintiff, a sculptor, made a plaster bust of the deceased husband
of the defendant, under an agreement that she was not to be bound to take it
unless she was satisfied with it. When it was finished she refused to accept
it: Hield, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. As the bust was tb
be satisfactory to the defendant, it was for he" alone to determine whether it
was so, and it was not enough that her dissatisfaction was unreasonable.
Zde.id v. Clark, 133.
5. Where a party to a contract by his acts or default renders the perform-
ance of the contract impossible, the other party to the contract may treat the
same as rescinded. Seipel v. International Life Ins. and Trust Co., 197. See
infra, 11.
6. Courts will always refuse to enforce contracts contrary to public policy,
however in actions upon them, that fact may be made to appear. M7ght v.
Rindskopf, 274.
7. A.contract between A., an attorney, and B., a party indicted for several
offences, that B. should furnish certain evidence in other cases and should
then, through the influence of A. with the prosecuting attorney, be permitted
to plead guilty to the count involving the least penalty, and thereupon B.
should pay A. a large sum: Hdd, void. Id.
8. A sale of intoxicating liquors, made while the prohibiting law was in
force, is not a lawful consideration for a promise subsequent to the repeal of
the act. Lud'ow v. Hardy, 737.
9. Whether one promise be the consideration for another, or whether the
performance and not the mere promise be the consideration, is to be deter-
mined by the intention and meaning of the parties, as collected from the
instrument and the application of good sense and reason to each particular
case. Jones v. United States, 500.
10. Where an act is to be performed by the plaintiff before the accruing of
the defendant's liability under his contract, the plaintiff must prove either his
performance of such condition precedent or an offer to perform it which the
defendant rejected, or his readiness to fulfil the condition until the defendant
discharged him from so doing or prevented the execution of the matter which
the contract required him to perform. Id. I
11. No man can be obliged to perform an impossibility, but where the con-
tract is to do a thing which is possible in itself, the performance is not ex-
cused by the occurrence of an inevitable accident or other contingency,,
although it was not foreseen by the party nor was within his control. Id.
12. A contract whereby certain parties agree to deliver all the lumber they
have to two persons, is assignable by one of the latter to his associate. Hart
v. Suwmners, 671.
13. An averment of a sale of any lumber to third parties is an averment
of a breach, and there was no need to set forth the precise terms of payment
by usage, an averment of readiness at all times to comply with the contract
being sufficient. Id.
14. On such a contract a special count lies for selling lumber not so far set
apart as to pass title to plaintiff, and also for such as had already been passed,
while the common counts lie for the latter. 
Id.
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15. An executory contract for personal services cannot be assigned by the
employer unless the employee asezts. Cliapin v. Lon gworth, 671.
16. In an action by the employee against the employer and his assignee,
tile allegation that subsequent to the agreement of the employer to assign the
emplovee rendered the same service for the assignee 'during part of the time
embraced by the contract, and received compensation from him at the rate
therein specified, does not show such substitution. I'd.
CONTRACTOR. See NEGLIGENCE, 1.
CONVERSION. See WILL, 4.
CONVEYANCE. See VOLUNTAnT CONVETANCE.
CORPORATION. See CONST'TUTIONAL LAW, 6, 7, 8, 10-13; EQTITTT. "n;
MAND MU5, 1 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; SHERIFF, 2.
1. There is a material difference between such an artificial creation as a
corporation and a natural person. The latter can do anything not forbidden
by law. The former can do only what is authorized by its charter. Where
several corporations, existing by virtue of separate charters, are consolidated
by a new charter, the od &orporations cease to exist, and the new one com-
mences its existence with only such powers as its own charter gives it.
Shulds v. State of Ohio, 133.
2. In case a corporation on request refuses or neglects to bring suit against
a defaulting officer, such suit may be brought by a stockholder himself.
Hfazard v. Durant, 134.
3. A corporation cannot release the fraud of a defrauding officer, except
by a unanimous vote of its stockholders. Id.
4. The legislation of the state making provision for the service of process,
a foreign corporation, transacting business there, may be estopped by such
legislation from pleading that the corporation is not an inhabitant, or is not
found in the state for service of process. Williams v. Empire Transportation
Co, 698.
5. A foreign corporation is liable to he sued in New Jersey on a contract
ma-le in that state, when summoned in accordance with its laws. National
Co.:denwrd .M1ilk Co. v. Brandenburgh, 671.
6. If the contract sued on was made in New Jersey the court will not in-
quire whether, in truth, the contract was made by the corporation. Such an
inquiry must be reserved for tile trial of the cause. Id.
7. A corporation created by concurrent legislation of two states has a legal
domicile in each state.- Bridye Co. v. Mayer, 672.
8. In regard to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a corporation is a cit-
izen of the state bywhich it wus created. Erie Railway Co. v. Stringer, 763.
9. A foreign railroad corporation does not become an Ohio corporation or
a citizen of Ohio by merely leasing, possessing and operating in that state
the property of an Ohio railroad company. Id.
10. Independently of statutes, it is the duty of a private corporation to
keep its principal place of business, its records and the residence of its officers
so located as to render it accessible to the process and the visitorial power of
the state by which it is created. State v. R ailway Co., 672.
11. While it is clear that p~oceedings by scirefacias, or otherwise, against a
corporation for the forfeiture of its charter, cannot be maintained, except by
the authority of t1e legislature, a special Act of Assembly for this purpose is
not required. S.,ate v. Con'solidation Coal Co., 338.
12. It is competent for the legislature by n general law to authorize suits
for this purpose to be instituted at the instance of private parties or to confer
the power upon the governor to cause the proceeding to" be instituted in his
discretion, whenever he may consider the public interests so require. Id.
13. Where in the original charter of a railroad company the legislature
expressly reserved the power to alter, repeal or annul the charter, the question
whether a proposed amendment of the charter is consistent with the public
interests and with the prosperity of the company, is one which by tie charter is
made to depend upon the discretion of the legislature, and is not to be deter-
mined by the courts. Co.l Co. v. Coal Co., 338.
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14. The courts are bound to regard a company incorporated according to
all the required forms of law, as a corporation so far as third parties are con-
cerned, until it is dissolved by a judicial proceeding in behalf of the govern-
ment that created it. 'on'der Co. v. Sin einer, 404.
15. Where the name of an individual appears on the stock-book of a cor-
poration as a stockholder, the primaJucne presumption is that be is the owner
of the stock. Tarnball v. Payson, 197.
16. The charter of a corporation providing that ", no stockholder in i.aid
corporation shall have the right to transfer his shares therein, without first
giving ten days' notice in writing of such intention, and ten days' refusal
thereof to said corporatidn, at the lowest price at whichi he will sell to any
other person ; and if in such case said corporation elect to purchase said
shares at said lowest price, such stockholder shall, on the price Ieing offered
to him, convey said shares to said corporation." A stockholder offered to the
corporation a certain number of shares at a gross price, and subsequently sold
to a third party a smaller number of shares at a given price per share. Veld,
that the offer to the corporation did not comply with the provisions of-the
charter, and that the corporation could not be compelled to allow the transfhr
of the stock sold upon its books. Sfweetland v. Quidnick Co., 197.
17. The stock of a corporation may be held by a valid title without a cer-
tificate. The right to the stock is in the nature of a non-negotiable chose in
action. Dewing v. Perdicaries, 472.
18. The assignee takes it subject to all the equities which existed against
it in the hands of the assignor. Ad.
19. Even a negotiable note which is void ab initio can no more be enforced
against the maker by a bona fide holder than by the payee. Id.
20. Contracts of subscription to the stock of a corporation, if procured by
fraud, will be set aside. Vrceland v. Nw .Jersey Stone Co., 534.
21. An oral contract of subscription will not be enforced under a charter
requiring that such contracts shall be made in writing. Id.
22. Where a fraud is committed in the name of a corporation, by persons
having the right to speak for it, foi their personal benefit, they will be made
to answer personally for the injury inflicted by their fraud. Id.
23. In a suit by a corporation, a plea of general issue admits the compe-
tency of the plaintiff to sue as such. Pullman v. Upton, 596.
24. An assignee of corporate stock who has caused it to be transferred to
himself on the books of the company, and holds it as collateral security for a
debt due from his assignor, is liable for unpaid balances thereon to the com-
pany or to the ereditors of the company, after it has become bankrupt. Id.
25. It cannot be shown, in defence to a suit of a corporation, that the char-
ter was obtained by fraud ; neither can it be shown that the charter has been
forfeited by misuser or nonuser. Advantage can only be taken of such for-
feiture by process on behalf of the state. County If Macon v. Shores, 403.
26. In a suit on a bond issued by a county, the objection that the corpora-
tion was not organized within the. time limited by the charter is unavailing.
Id.,
27. Where a corporation has power under any circumstances to issue such
securities, the bona fide taker has a right to presume they were issued under
circumstances which gave the requisite authority. Id. See MUNICIPAL
BONDS, 6.
28. Although there may be a defect of power in a corporation to make a
contract, yet if a contract made by it is not in violation of its charter, and
the corporation has by its promise induced a party relying on the promise to
expend money and perform his part thereof, the corporation is liable on the
contract. Hitchcock v. City of Galveston, 596.
29. A sale by the assignee of an insolvent corporation is not invalidated
by the fraud of a stockholder committed without the knowledge of the
assignee. Trevitt v. Conrerse. 534.
30. The personal liability of the officers and stockholders of a corporation
for a debt contracted by the corporation can arise only out of some statutory
provision. SoIt Lake City Nutjonal Bank v. HIendrickson, 671.
COSTS. See MALCrOUS PRosEcuTioN, 4.
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COUNTY. See CORPORATION, 26 ; MrNIcIPA.L BONDS.
COURT OF CLAIMS. See CO.pIScATION'.
Jurisdiction is not conferred upon the Court of Claims to allow mere extra
allowances in a case where there is no promise to that efflect, either express
or implied. Power to deternine claims founded upon any law of Congress
or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract ex-
press or implied with thc government of the United States, and all claims
which may be referred to it hy either house of Congress, is vested in the
Court of Claims. Mere applications for extra allowance unsupported by any
contract must he made to Congress. Hawkins v. United States, 62.
COURTS. See CONTEMPT; CORPORATION, 13, 14; ERRORS AD APPEALS,
1-3; IIUSBAND AND WIFE, 4-5; REmOVAL OF CAUSES; UNITED STATES
CouRTs, 3.
1. Civil courts cannot re-judge the judgment of an ecclesiastical tribunal
in matters within the latter's jurisdiction ; hut the decision of such tribunal
upon its own jurisdiction over the subJect-tiatter is not exclusive. The con-
trol of the civil courts over the civil rights of the citizens cannot be ousted.
Perrj v. Whet eler, 24.
2. A board of reference under canon 4 of the Protestant Episcopal Church
is an ecclesiastical court, and the civil courts may inquire into its organiza-
tion and decide whether it has acted within the scope of its constitutional
authority. I.
3. The word "1 permanently," as used in the call of a rector, means indefi-
nitely, and constitutes a contract that he should continue to hold the office of
rector till one or the other of the parties desires to terminate the relation, and
then to be terminated after reasonable notice and with the approval of the
ecclesiastical authority of the diocese. Id.
4. Certain canons of the Episcopal Church construed. Id.
5. The decisions of the state courts upon the rights of parties under state
laws are final an I binding upon the federal codrts, and a decision of the lat-
ter, which is in opposition to the construction 'of state laws given by the
highest court of the state, will not be regarded by the state courts. Id.
6. lMtason v. .Jones, 13 Wall. 679, reviewed and dissented from. Id.
COVENANT. See EQUITY, 6.
1. Where in an action on a covenant of seisin the defendant admits the
covenant and alleges scisin in himself at the date of the deed, it devolves
upon him to prove the seisin, and if he fails, the plaintiff will 'recover. Cock-
rel v. Protor, 339.
2. The existence of a paramount title, whether asserted or not, is a breach
of the covenant of seisin, whether it be express, or be implied by the words,
"grant, bargain anti sell." Id.
3. If a grantee fails to take possession of unoccupied premises conveyed
by lis deed, or having taken possession abandons them, he can recover of
his grantor nominal damages only for breach of his covenant of seisin,
unless there was a hostile assertion of a paramount title. Id.
4. Where land is conveyed to a minor, with provision reserving the whole
of said premises for use as a homestead for his mother, himself and sister,
until he arrive at the age ofr 21 years, or until his mother's death within that
period, he takes an interest and present right capable of being so disturbed,
and infringed as to give him an immediate right of action and of suing alone,
upon a remote grantor's covenant of quiet enjoyment. Mason v. Kellogg,
404.
5. Where land is sold with a covenant against encumbrances, and an
encumbrance exists bf a permanent character, which impairs the value of the
premises, the damages will be measured by the diminished value of the prem-
ises. Mitch,ll v. Stonle/, 275.
6. If a question arises whether a covenant he joint or several with respect
to the covenantees, regard must be had to the interests of the covenantees in
the covenant. But this rule has no application to the construction of a cove-
nant. with respecl to the obligation of the covenantors. Boytdv. Kienzle, 405.
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CRIMINAL LAW. See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 7; BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 2;
EvIDENCE, 15.
I. Genera lg.
1. Unless the prisoner was present during the progress of the trial, and at
the rendition of the verdict, a judgment against him will be reversed. State
v. Able, 274.
2. A detective who joins a criminal organization for the purpose of expos-
ing it, and honestly carries out that design, is not an accessory before the
fact, although he may have encouraged and counselled parties who were about
to commit crime, if in so doing he intended that they should be discovered
and punisled. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 198.
3. It is competent for the Commonwealth to corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice, as to occurrences subsequent to the crime, where they explain the
relations, conduct and motive of the prisoners, although they do not connect
them directly with the commission of the crime. Carroll v. Conmnonweulth,
198.
4. The admission of an accomplice as a witness for the government upon
implied promise of pardon rests in the discretion of the court. Wright v.
Rindskopf, 272.
5. An agreement of the public prosecutor, unsanctioned by the court, for
immunity to several defendants, in several indictments, upon one of them
becoming a witness for the prosecution upon still other indictments, would be
a fraud upon the court. Id. See CONTRACT, 7.
6. Where objection is made to certain counsel aiding in the prosecution, on
the ground that he is employed by the complaining witness and other private
persons, it is error for the court to refuse to permit such employment to be
shown, even though the prosecuting attorney states that the counsel acts in the
cause at his request. Sneed v. The People, 473.
7. The statute simplifying the forms of informations does not dispense
with the necessity of setting forth, in cases of statutory offences, allegations
conforming to the statutes that define them. Id.
8 But where the offence is an ordinary common law one, an information
in the language of the statute is sufficient. Under our system, entitling the
accused to a previous examination, he can always ascertain fully the facts to
be brought against him. Id.
9. Where a statute specifically defines what acts shall constitute a misde.
meanor, it is sufficient in the indictment to bring the defendant within the
statutory description of the crime. State v. ialstead, 134.
10. The violation of a prescribed public duty by a ministerial officer is in-
dictable, without being made so in terms by statute. Stote v. Startiup, 134.
11. In the absence of express words in the statute making the act criminal,
the indictment must charge that the offence was committed with an evil intent
or wilfully. Id.
12. An indictment for an offence created by statute must describe the
offence in the words of the statute, and if the statute creating the offence con-
tains in its enacting clause exceptions, it is necessary to negative such excep-
tions in the indictment. Connor v. Commonwealth, 535.
13. An omission to set out words charged as obscene in an indictment is no
ground for a motion to quash. Qitcen v. Bradlaugh, 198.
14. A juror is competent who has formed an opinion from what he has
read, but does not think the opinion is so fixed that he would not be governed
bv the evidence. Curley v. Conimonwealth, 198.
15. In a homicide case, where the jury has been sworn on the last day of
the term, the court may adjourn from day to day, and proceed with the trial
of the case after the expiration of the term. Carroll v. Commonwealth, 198.
16. To show motive for crime, it is competent for the Commonwealth to
prove the existence of a secret criminal organization, and to show that one
division of such organization furnished men to commit murder in compensa-
tion for a like crime by members of another division. Id.
17. Where homicide is admitted, and the defence of insanity is set up, the
burden of establishing the defence by a preponderance of testimony, rests
upon defendant. Bergen v. State, 535.
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18. The uneontrollable propensity which will relieve a person from the
consequences of a crime, must have its origin alone in a diseased or insane
mind. State v. Jhf,whorter, 535.
19. Dlrunkenncss is no excuse for crime, but can negative the intent, and
therefore it may show that the crime could not have been committed. People
v. 1d'alker, 473.
20. In a trial for homicide it was shown that the deceased was terribly
beaten ani left insensible by his assailants. lIe was carried to a house near
by, and on the following morning started to his home, about a mile distant,
unaccompanied and on foot. About midway to his home he was met by an
acquaintance, whom he accosted, saying, "Bill, it is all up with me ; I will
never get over it ;" and then went on to speak of his wounds and how they
were inflicted, and from the effects of which he died tino days thereafter.
Hed, that this evidence was properly received as dying declarations. Kehoe
v. Cnznonwealth, 737.
21. Where one has been convicted of an infamous crime, hut not sentenced,
and motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial are pending, he is not
a competent witness for another who was jointly indicted for the same offence
and granted a separate trial. Id.-
22. Where several parties are jointly indicted and separate trials granted,
one who has not yet been tried is not a competent witness for either of the
others on trial. Id.
23. An act which is not an offence at the time it is committed cannot
become such by any subsequent independent act of the party. United States
v. Fox, 597.
24. It is competent for Congress to enforce by suitable penalties all legis-
lation necessary or proper to the execution of powers with which it is
intrusted ; and any act committed with a view of evading such legislation or
fraudulently securing its benefit, may be made an offence against the United
States. But it is otherwise when an act committed in a state has no relation
to the execution of a power of Congress or to any hatter within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. An act having no such relation is one in respect
to which the state can alone legislate. Id.
25. MICROSCOPICAL EXAMINATION OF BLOOD IN REsLATION TO CRIMINAL
TRIALS, 554.
26. 'OST-MORTEM IMBIBITION OF POISONS IN ITS M1EDICO-LEGAL RELA-
TIONS, 145.
I. A.ssa lt and Battery.
27. 'rhe right of an assailed party to self-defence does not depend on his
believing or njt believing at the moment that a call would bring some one
else to interfere in his behalf. Except in special cases, no private person is
bound in law, even if called on, to defend others. The People v. Lilly, 405.
Iit. Conspiracy.
28. A combination between one member of a partnership and a third per-
son to issue and put in circulation the notes of the firm, for the purpo-e
of paying his individual debts, the intention of the combination being fraud-
ulent, is an indictable conspiracy. State v. Cole, 134.
29. An indictment founded'upon section 5440 of the Revised Statute.q,
alleging generally a conspiracy to defraud the United States, is insufficient.
United States v. t'raflon, 127.
30. A conspiracy to defraud the United States cannot exist in contempla-
tion of said section 5440, where the contemplated fraud depends upon the
passage of a future Act of Congress to make it effective. Id.
IV. False Pretence.
31. An untrue assertion by a person who is endeavoring to procure goods
on credit, that he is not trading with and is not indebted to any other person,
is a sufficient false pretence to support an indictment. Smith v. State, 525.
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V. Larceny.
32. The wrongful taking and carrying away of the property of another,
for the purpose of obtaining a reward for its return, is larceny. Berry v.
S'ate, 472.
33. At common law there could be no larceny of a fixture if severed and
carried away by one continuous act ; but the modern authorities apply this
rule only to things issuing out of, or zrowing; upon the land ; not to per-
sonal chattels that are constructively annexed thereto, as e. y. chandeliers
screwed into pipes fastened to the ceiling of a house. Smith v. Coammon-
wealth, 597.
34. An indictment charging the defendant with having feloniously stolen
"bank bills, a more particular description of which cannot now be given,"
of a certain value specified, and the property of a per-on named, is sufficient
on motion to quash. h1art v. ."tate, 63.
35. A conviction upon evidence describing the property simply as " bills"
is erroneous. Id.
VI. Manslaughter and Murder.
36. Where several parties unite to make an assault, which results in honi-
cide, the acts and declarations of the defendant immediately prior to the
assault, what was said in his presence by those acting in concert with him,
and what occurred after the attack, are competent evidence. KAhoe v. Coi-
monwealth, 737.
37. Mere approval by a bystander of a murder committed in his presence
does not make him an accomplice. State v. Cox, 274.
38. If one person intentionally inflicts upon another a wound calculated
to destroy life, and death ensues therefrom within a year and a day, the
offence is murder or manslaughter, as the ase may be; and he is none the
less responsible for the result, although it may appear that the deceased might
have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or that unskilful or
improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to his death. State
v. Bantley, 446.
VII. Perjury.
39. Where a charge of perjury is based upon testimony given in reference
to a past transaction, evidence that the accused was "4greatly intoxicated" at
the time such transaction occurred, is a circumstance proper to be submitted
to the consideration of the jury in determining whether the accused know-
ingly testified falsely. Lytle v. State, 535.
VIII. Rape.
40. The prisoner professed to give medical and surgical advice for money.
The prosecutrix, a girl of nineteen, consulted him with respect to illness
from which she was suffering. He advised that a surgical operation should
be performed, and, under pretence of performing it, had carnal connee'; n
with the prosecutrix: Held, that he was guilty of rape. Qreen v. F lattery,
198.
CURTESY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
CUSTOM. See Ctcx, 2; MINES, 5.
DAMAGES. See CostMOm CARRIER. 9 ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24; CovE-
NANT, 3, 5 ; LIBEL, 5 : MALICIOUS PBOSECUTION, 2 ; 31ASTER AND SER-
VANT, 12, 13; TELEGRAPH, 1-3 ; VERDICT, I.
1. In a proceeding to condemn a right of way for a railroad through a
tract of land, the jury should assess the compensation due the owner for the
land to be appropriated irrespective of benefits. Railway Co. v. Lonyworth,
199.
2. Mental anguish is a proper element of compensatory damages, and the
outrage and indignity which have accompanied an injury are to be estimated
even in eases where exemplary damages do not lie. AfcKinley v. Railroad
Co., 69.
3. Timber was cut from lands of B by trespassers: who, by their labor,
INDEX. 821
DAMAGES.
increased its value threefold. It was then sohl to an innocent purchnser,
who was sued by B. : 1feld, that B. cannot recover the value of the timber
as enhanced by the labor of the wrongdoers, after it was severed from the
realty. Lake Shore 6- Mirhilan outhirn I.Rilwa!/ Co. v. IutcIdns, 576.
4. Damages are assessable as of the date of the suit. Brovster v. Sussex
R,tilrand Co., 597.
5. In an action for injiury to the plaintiff's land and buildings, by removal
of lateral support through mining operations by the defendant on his own
land, it was found that, in nildition to existing damage, there would be future
damage to the extent of 150/. Held, that such damage was recoverable in
the action. Lamb v. Vaker, 793.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See APPLICATION OF PATMENT8, 1-3; AssIGN-
MENT ; ATTACHMENT, I ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 23-30; SURETY; TROVER,
1. If the intent of the assignment of a contract be to defraud the creditors
of the assignor, the assignee can take nothing thereby, and is not entitled,
as against the creditors, to the amount he may have paid. Chapman v. Ran-
son, 64.
2. Where after the filing of an opinion in the Supreme Court, affirming
a judgment of the court below, the judgment debtor conveyed a large amount
of real estate to his sun and grandchildren, in consideration of love and
affection, and a small nominal consideration expressed, it was held that such
conveyance was r'raudulcnt. Potter v. Phillips, 64.
3. A fraudulent grantor is not a necessary party to an action against his
grantees to set aside a conveyance alleged to be in fraud of his creditors. Id.
4. Whatever remedy may be had in the bankrupt courts, preferences to
creditors are allowed by the state laws. Jordan v. W'hite, 405.
5. The fact that delay and hindrance to creditors were caused and intended
by a debtor's transfer of his property, would avoid it even though for value,
if the purchaser was not a creditor, but otherwise if he was. .d.
6. A wife, the same as other creditors, may obtain preferences from her
husband as to debts due her. d.
7. An assignee of a mortgage takes it subject to all defences in favor (f
the mortgagor, but free from latent equities existing in favor of third per-
sons. De MVitt v. Van Sickle, 537.
8. A mortgage executed as a step in a scheme to defraud creditors, will be
upheld, even against creditors, in the hands of a bonafide assignee for value.
id.
9. Property conveyed in fraud of creditors will be reclaimed for the benefit
of creditors, if reclamation can be effcoted without injustice to innocent third
persons. d.
10. He who buys any part of the avails of a scheme to defraud creditors,
in order to keep what he gets, must not only pay for it, but he must be inno-
cent of any purpose to further the fraud. I.
1I. Where a debtor voluntarily gives a security for a debt from which he
is dikcharged by a deed of composition, such security may be enforced.
Cross'e' v. Moore, 668.
12. But any agreement with one creditor for an advantage to him over
other creditors, made to induce him to join in the composition, is utterly
void, and is incapable of being enforced or confirmed even as against the
assenting debtor. A security given in pursuance of such a bargain or a sub-
sequent promise of payment, is equally v6id with the antecedent agreement;
and money paid by the debtor under such an agreement, in excess of the due
proportion of such creditor's debt, may bc recovered back. Id.
13. Where a debtor conveys lands to his creditor in trust to sell and from
the proceeds to satisfy the deht and pay the balance tq the debtor, and the
debtor dies without having paid the debt, and without having elected to take
the land instead of its proceeds, his personal representative is the proper
party to compel the execution of the trust by a sale of the lands. Craiq v.
Jennings, 473.
14. After such trust has been executed by a sale under a decree at the suit
of the administrator, it is too late for the heir to elect to take the land. Id.
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15. The payment by a debtor of a part of his liquidated debt is not a satis-
faction of the whole, unless made and accepted upon some new consideration.
Where, however, the debt is* unliquidated and the amount is uncertain, this
rule does not apply. Baird v. United 13tates, 598.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE. See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
DECEIT. See FRAUD, 3, 4; INFANT, 1.
1. Where a party making false representations of his solvency to induce
credit, at the time believed them to be true, le is not liable to an action of
deceit. Dilworth v. Bradner, 738.
2. It was erroneous for the court to say that the jury must decide whether
the party making such representations had reasonable grounds for his belief
that they were true." I'd.
DEED. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 34; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 5; WATERS, I.
1. The conditions upon which an escrow was to be delivered to the grantee
therein named, may be proved by parol. Campbell v. Thomas, 135.
2. Where the grantor in the deed retains the right of control over it, it is
not an escrow. Id.
3. The mere facts that a dgposit with a third person was made in pursu-
ance of a previous oral agreement between the grantor and the grantee for
a sale of the land, and that a small part of the agreed price was paid at the
time of such agreement, will not deprive the grantor of his right of control
over the deed. Id.
4. Such a deposit makes the deed an escrow : 1. Where there is a prior
valid contract between the parties named in the deed, for the sale of the
land. 2. Where the delivery of the deed to the depositary itself passes title
to the grantee. Id.
5. Conveyances by officers of the law, discussed. Note to True v. Emery,
162.
6. Validity of deed of alleged lunatic, discussed. lNote to 1canlan v. Cobb,
312.
7. Delivery of deeds after the grantor's death, by a third party to whom
they we're delivered by the grantor, under in.tructins to give them to the
grantees immediately after his death, is effectual to render them operative.
Latham v. Udell, 473.
8. The law has no concern with the reasons which have induced a grantor
dr testator to discriminate against one of his children. Id.
9. It is not unlawful for a wife to exert an influence over her husband for
her own benefit or for that of others, unless she acts fraudulently, or extorts
benefits when her husband is not a free agent. Id.
10. When a deed conveying land does not accurately describe the land
Intended to be conveyed, it is the duty of the grantee to tender to the
grantor, for execution, a confirmatory deed. Ieck v. Rianka, 536.
11. In locating lands, the calls always prevail over the courses and dis-
tances. Id.
12. If parties have taken possession of land and occupied for a series of
years under a deed containing an erroneous description, the mistake, as
against the grantor and his representatives, will be corrected, where the evi-
dence clearly shows such mistake. Broadwiell v. Phillips, 608.
13. Rights of third persons acquired in good faith are not affected by the
reformation of a deed. New" Orleans Canal and Banking Co. v. Montgomery,
136.
DEMURRAGE. See SHtPPINO, 6.
DIVORCE. See ABATEMENT, 1; HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOMICILE. See CORPORATION, 7; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14; WILL, 9.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. See GtFT, 1.
A check drawn by a testator payable to his Vife or her order, given to her
shortly before his death, endorsed by her and paid into a foreign bank against
the amount of which she drew : Held, a good donatio mortis cauma, although
INDEX.
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thi. check was not presented for payment at the bank on which it was drawn
till after the death of the testator. Rils v. Ptar" 2(00.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II; LEGACY.
DRUNKENNESS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 19, 39 ; WILL, 6-8.
EASEMENT. Sec MUNICIPAL CbRPORATION, 13.
1. Upon the question whether a certain alley-way had been acquired by
adverse possession : Held, that a claim of right made while using tIe alley
bv a former owner from whom the present claimant derived title, was admis-sle as giving character to the use of the alley and showing it to have been
adverse. Turner v. Baldwin, 136:
2. An easement in light and air, to be supplied- to the ancient windows of
one person from the premises of another, cannot be acquired in Indiana by
mere use or prescription. Stein v. Hacuk, 435.
3. By the act of that state " touching easements," the legislature intended
neither to recognise nor adopt the English rule in relation to casemenis in
light and air, hut to prevent the future acquisition of such easements, except
in conformity with the provisions of such statute. Id.
4. The riglt to an ancient light is not to be measured by the purpo-e for
which the light actually was used. Moore v. flail, 59R.
5. Implied grants are not to be favored. 'and will not be held to exist ex-
cept in cases of clear necessity. Doliff v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 793.
6. In an action by the owners of a factory against the defendants for excava-
ting tie soil of an adjoining house in such a manner as to leave the founda-
tion of part of the factory without sufficient lateral support, and thereby caus-
ing it to fall, it appeared that the two buildings had apparently been erected
at the same time, and were estimated to be upwards of one hundred years old.
Both had been occupied as dwelling-houses until about twenty-seven years
before the accident, but the plaintiffs' predecessor had then tonvertel his
house into a coach factory, removing the internal walls, and erecting a.tack
of brickwork, which both served as a chimney stack and supported the girders
which had to be put up to sustain the floors." The defendants, in taking down
the adjoining house and in digging cellars which had not previously existed,
left a support for the chimney stack which proved insufficient, and it lell,
drawing after it the entire factory : field, that no grant of a right or lateral
support for the factory by the adjacent land could be presumed from the enjoy-
ment of such support by the plaintiff for twenty years. Angus v. Dalion, 645.
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. See COURTS, 1-4.
The nature of the contract between a minister and his church discussed.
ote to Perry v. ||Wheeler, 33.
EJECTMENT.
1. A defendant in an action of ejectment, who claims adversely to both
the parties to a mortgage, cannot avail himself of the mortgage as an out-
standing title to defeat the action. Hlardwick v. Jones, -339.
2. A person claiming title to land does not forfeit his right by attempting
to buy in a conflicting claim. Id.
3. It is no objection to the plaintiff's title in ejeetment that he is not a
purchaser for a valuable consideration. -d.
ELECTION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 5.
1. Ballots cast at an election are the primary and controllingevidence. As
between the ballots cast at an election and a canvass of those ballots by the
election officers, the former are the controlling evidence. Hudson v. Soinoon,
104.
2. In order to continue the ballots as controlling evidence it must appear
that they have been preserved in the manner and by the officers prescribed in
the statute, and that while in such custody they have not been so exposed to
the reach of unauthorized persons as to afford a reasonable probability of
their having been changed or tampered with. d.
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EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, II; WAY.
EQUITY. See BOND, 1; DEED, 12, 13; FRAVD, 2; INJUNCTIoN; MUNICIPAL
COHPORATION, 5, 6; PARTNERSIzP, 11; SPECIFIC 'ERFORMAN Ci., 2-3.
1. Both the original and cross-bill constitute one suit and ought to be
heard at the same time. Consequently any decision or decree in the pro-
ceedings upon the cross-bill is not a final decree in the suit and not the sub-
ject of an appeal. Ex parte Alhibanut Railroad Co.. 136.
2. A cross-bill must grow out of the matters alleged in the original bill,
and is used to bring the whole dispute before the court, so that there may be
a complete decree touching the subJect-matter of the action. Id.
3. A mistake entitling it party to relief in equity must be a mistake of
fact, without negligence on his part. Upiham v. Tlhmill, 48.
4. Ignorance of legal consequences is not a mistake of fact for which equity
will grant relief. id.
5. A purchaser at an execution sale cannot in equity be excused from con-
sumnmating his purchase, because he supposed hinn-clf to be buying the entire
estate in question, and not the " right, title and interest" of tie judgment
debtor in it. 1d.
6. A court of equity has power to specifically enforce a lessee's covenant
to build or repair, where, from the impossibility of estimating damages or the
danger of irreparable loss, an action at law would be an inadequate remedy.
Kentuck1y River Xtrviqztion Co. v. Gomoinecalth, 176.
7. In such a case the insolvency of tite lessee is no defence. Id.
8. Forfeitures are not favored in equity, but there are cases where a rescis-
sion of the contract may be decreed, although the act or omission does not
fall within any express condition of forfeiture. Id.
9. In an action at law on a promissory note, facts which constitute mere
matter of defence will not, in general, entitle the defendant to equitable re-
lief. Qwdbec Bank v. Weyand, 200.
10. It is error to decree a canctellation of such note, for the mere purpose
of preventing an anticipated erroneous judgment by a court of law. hd.
11. A court of equity has jurisdiction to establish a title to real estate by
estoppel against a former owner -who by representations has induced another
to purchase from his grantee under a void dced. l1ade v. Bunn, 275.
12. The power of a court of equity to relieve against a judgment upon the
ground of fraud is well settled. Brown v. County oJBttena Vista, 339.
13. The power extends also to cases of accident and mistake. But such
relief is never given upon any ground of which the complainant could have
availed himself in the proceeding at law. Id.
14. In a suit in equity relief can only be granted in accordance with some
one or more allegations in the bill. ot-or()r V. Poole, 339.
15. A court of equity will not set aside a voluntary conveyance as between
the parties, unless upon the ground of fratd. Id.
16. To obtain relief on the ground of mistake, it must appear in the bill
what it is that is relied upon ; and the proof must follow the allegation, so
that the court may know precisely what is as ked and what is the relief
sought. d.
17. Where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, it is sufficient to set
forth the substance of the transaction and the result, and relief will not be
denied if it be shown that the fraud was successfully accomplished, though in
a manner different from that charged. Mferrill v. Allen, 738.
18. In the ease of a general creditor's suit, the simple fact that a party
appears and files his claim, raises the presumption that he intends to make
himself a party to the record. Thomas v. Farmers' Bank o' Maryland, 340.
19. Where, in an action on an agreement to abandon a certain business in
a specified town, the plaintiff alleged a breach of the agreement to his dam-
age a specified sum, for which he asked judgment, and then stated that by
reason of the defendant's insolvency he would be remediless, unless the de-
fendant was restrained from further'violating the agreement, and prayed for
a perpetual injunction, and the defendant answered denying the agreement:
.Held, that the bill would not lie. Brundridge v. Goodlove, 405.
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20. The misapplication of the funds of a corporation by its officers or
agents, authorizes the company to resort to equity in order to compel such
officers to account for such breach of trust, even though it were conceded that
an adequate remedy at law exists. Citi-ens' Loan Association v. Lyon, 536.
ERRORS ANT) APPEALS. See BILL or EXCEPTIONS, 5, 6 ; EVIDENCE, I ;
HABEAS CORPUS ; P'LEADING, 3.
I. The-Suprenic Court has no jurisdiction to revise the action of an infe-
rior court upon granting or refusing a new trial, and the final judgment
of sueb court cannot be examined through its rulings upon that question.
Kerr v. Cluanpit, 275.
2. A superior court malt have hefore it a bill of exceptions upon which the
final judgment of the cort below may be reviewed, or it will not examine
into any alleged errors, except such a; are otherwise apparent on the face
of the record. eac
3. The Supreme Court can only re-examine the final judgment in the suit,
and for that purpose joust look alone to the record of that judgment as it is
sent to them. GoodenoiAh Co. v. Rhode Island Co., 200.
4. Upon a writ of error to reverse a judgment by default, such defects in a
declaration or complaint as could have been taken advantage of before judg-
ment by general demurrer may be brought under review. XcAllister v. Kuhn,
474.
ESCAPE. THE LAw IN CIVIL ACTIONS, 345, 417, 481, 545.
ESCROW. See DEED, 1-4.
ESTOPPEL. See CORPORATION, 4 ; EQUITY, 11 ; INSURANCE, 1 ; JUDGMENT,
2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, I ; TRUST, 5.
1. Where a declaration is made to one person, and is not intended for
others, a bystander, who overhears it, cannot set it up as an estoppel. Kin-
ney v. WVhiton, 137.
2. Plaintiffs having bought a lot, relying upon the opinion of defendant,
an attorney at law, that the title was good, subsequently sold the lot to de-
fendant on credit, giving him a bond for title. In a suit to recover the price
defendant was estopped to show that plaintiffs had acquired no title to the
lot. ,Soward v. Johnston, 276.
EVIDENCE. See AGENT, 11 ; ATTORNEY, 1-3; BILLS AND NOTES, 9, 16, 17;
CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 16, 20, 36, 39 ; GUARANTY, 1; INSANITY, 5 ; INSUR-
ANCE, 2, 3, 5, 6, 21 ; LIBEL, 3, 4; MORTGAGE, 15; SLANDER, 4; SURETY,
7 ; TRIAL, 3 ; W LL, I I ; WITNESS.
1. Although a written agreement cannot be varied by proof of the cir-
cumstances out of which it grew, yet such circumstances are constantly
resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the subject-matter, and the stand-
point of the parties in relation thereto. Reed v. Ins. Co., 65.
2. When a contract is first made by parol for the sale and purchase of a
horse, and a paper subsequently signed by the vendor, plainly intended to be
nothing more than a receipt for the purchase-money, parol evidence is admis-
sible of representations as to the soundness of the horse, made by the vendor
at the time of the sale. Perrine v. Cooley, 137.
3. A witness cannot testify'to a conclusion of law. Hoener v. Koch, 276.
4. Parol evidence is admissible to show that goods charged by the plaintiffs
to B. were sold upon the credit of a corporation of which he was agent, and
that the corporation received the goods and credited the plaintiffs for them.
Northford Rivet Co. v. Blackma'zn Jfanufacturing Co., 276.
5. The plaintiffs took the individual note of B. on account of the goods,
but it was not given or taken as payment of the accounf. Held, that this did
not discharge the liability of the corporation. Id,
6. Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or change the legal import
of a negotiable note in the hands of an endorsee. Mchorry v. Brooks, 342.
7. Written misrepresentations do not exclude oral ones. Match v. funt,
- 406.
8. In an action upon an instrument referring to a proposal to build a rail-
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road, and binding the signers to give their notes in aid thereof, evidence of
what the proposition was is admissible. Railrocd Co. v. 'tarnes, 794.
9. Where a plaintiff sues for damages from negligence claimed to have
produced a permanent disability, the defendant may compel plaintiff to sub-
mit to a personal examination by phybicians to enable them to testily to the
nature and extent of his injuries. Schrodcr v. Railroad Co., 119.
10. Where, pn an action for injuries hy the defendants' negligence, the
plaintiff is examined by medical men, their reports procured by the defend-
ants' attorney for the purpose of enabling him to give advice to the delendants
with reference to the action, are privileged from inspection. Frund v. T(
London, Chathamn 4- Denrer lJailu'ay Co., 65.
11. The character of offers made in the presence of the jury my be such,
even although the offers were rejected below, as to require, on crror, a rever-
sal of the judgment, where the party making such rejected offers obtains a
verdict. Scripps v. Reilly, 674.
12. All incompetent testimony should be excluded from the knowledge of
the jury. Id.
13. In a suit in equity to quiet title and restrain an action of ejectment, a
deposition of a witness in that action who has since died i. competent, the
action at law having been substantially between the same parties and for the
same land. IVnncr v. Fi.son, 544.
14. The presumption of innocence as probative evidence is not applicable in
civil cases, nor in revenue seizures. Lilientlal v. The United ats, 405.
15. In criminal cases the true rule is that the burden of proof never shifts;
that in all cases the jury must be satisfied defendant is guilty. Id.
16. In a civil action to recover damages for a criminal act, the same de-
gree of proof is required as would be necessary to convict the defendant
upon an indictment for the crime. Barton v. Thompson, 536. See I sut-
ANcE, 21.
17. Although the general rule is, that a party cannot impeach the general
reputation for truth of his own witness, vet he may prove the truth of any
particular fact relative'to the issue by any other competent testimony, in diret
contradiction of what one of his witnesses has testified. 5rnithv. Ehntrt, 406.
18. Where a contract is attested by a witness, such witness must he called
before the testimony of other witnesses can be received to prove that .tic
maker's signature is genuine. l-c:rncr v. Pailroad Co., 474.
19. Evidence impeaching return of officer of court, discussed. Mote to
oastin v. Duncan, 574.
20. Standards of comparison to be used by experts upon the trial of an
issue as to the genuineness of a signature are not admissible for that purpose,
unless they are clearly proved by witnesses who testify directly to their having
been written by the party whose signature is in question. Pavey v. Pavey,
598.
21. The testimony of experts is like any other testimony ; its value de-
pends on all the facts and circumstances of time case, and an instruction that
such "opinions are a very weak Mass of evidence and depend upon the facts
stated for weight," is erroneous. Eggers v. Eggers, 383.
EXECUTION. See ATTACH.MtENT ; ATTORNEY, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 3; SHER-
1FF, 2.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See DE3TOR AND CREDITOR,
13; LissiTATioNs, STATUTE OF, 10.
1. An administrator is merely the agent or trustee of the estate of the de-
cedent, acting immediately under the direction of the law prescribing his
duties. Collamnore v. Wildr, 135.
2. "Where an executor did not deposit the money of the estate in bank, but
used it as he wanted it, in his own business, Held, that he was' chargeable
with interest on balances in his hands. Clauser's Estate, 201.
3. Held, however, that he was not chargeable with interest on a sum
improperly paid by him as counsel fees, for which he was refused credijin
his account. Id.
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4. Couipen-ation is :llon ci to trustees as a reward for tile faithful excelu-
lin of, the Mrut. Id.
5. Ahhwu--h an executor is .1 trustee, and as such may he held aecountable
in a vurt of equity. iet the sureties maintain no such relation. Their obli-
gation beint one of contract, the remedy for I breach of it must be by an
aCtion at law ti the bond. Edes v. Gare, 340.
6. If there he any exception to this general rule, there must be special (Imn
per-diar circi toane's, making the exercise of jurisdiction necessary to the
protection of the rights and interests of parties. Id.
EXECUTORY DEVISE. See CHARITY, 6.
EXPERT. See EVIDEN CE, 20, 21 ; IGwAY, 3 ; I.SANITY, 5 ; WILL, 8.
EXPRESS COMPANY. See AGENT, 14, 15 ; COMtON CARRIER,'10, 11.
EXTRAI)ITION.
A.; to trial for offences not included in the extradition treaty, see Iawces
v. Commonualth, 536.
FACT. See EQuITY, 4.
FALSE PRETENCE. See CRIMINAL LAw, IV.
FIXTURES. See CRI3IINAL LAW, 33; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 9, 10; IORT-
GAGE, 8.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See CORPORATION, 4, 5, 6, 9.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 3.
1. The attetatien of a foreign record, under section 905 of the Revised Sta-
tutes of tile United States, must be made by the clerk in person. Beilcay
Co. v. Catter, 138.
2. In an action on the record of a judgment of a sister state, duly authen-
ticated, as required by Act of Congress of May 26th 1780, such judgment is
entitlel to full faith and credit, if it appears that such court had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the person. Sipes V. Whitney, 201.
FOREIGN STATUTE. See PLEADING, 11.
FORFEITURE. See CourORATION, 11, 25; EQUITY, 8: INSURANCE, 6, 7:
FORMIER ADJUI)ICATION.
1. In order to constitute one suit an estoppel in another, four conditions
muit exist, viz.: there must be an identity of the cause of action, of the par-
ties, of tile character in which the parties sue, and of the thing in controversy.
L3l,.ckwell v. Dibrell, 516.
2. Where an action to set aside a contract on the ground of fraud, and to
cancel an unonatured note given in pursuance of the contract, resulted in a
judgment affirming the validity of the contract ajd note: .el, that in a sub-
sequent action on the note, the defendant is estopped fr'bm setting up that the
cntract anal note were executed under a mutual mistake. Bell v. .11,Cut-
Inigh's Ex., 673.
3. Where a party brings an action for a part only of an entire indivisible
demand and recovers judgtient, he cannot subsequently maintain an action
for auothei part of tile same demand. Bird v. United Stetes 598.
4. A judgment dislsing an action without prejudice to a future action is
an entirety, and, though it may have been so rendered erroneously, it will
not constitute a bar to a subsequent action upon the same subject-matter.
I|iuztr v. .Nel, 406.
5. The complaint prayed that the defendant's interest in certain real eqtate
might be adjtdged a mortgage ; that deeds of partition between then might
he adjudged void at against plaintiff; that an account might be taken of their
advances to plaintiff and of the rents, issues and profits chargeable to them;
and that, upon payment of any balance found due them, they might le ad-
juth_,ed to reconvey to plaintiff. A former judgment herein directed that plain-
tiff "have judgment for the relief demanded in the complaint, conditioned
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upon the payment of whatever may be due." Held, that even if such judg-
ment were rendered without the court haviug its attention called to the ctfect
upon the details of the accounting between the parties, no rehearing having
been asked, they must control the present appeal so far as they apply. Wilcox
v. Bates, 406.
FRANCHISE. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 2-5.
FRAUD. See CORPORATION, 20, 22, 25; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1-3;
EQUITY, 11, 12, 15, 17; INFANT, 1 ; SALE, 6.
1. Where the money of an innocent person has gone into the coffers of the
nation by means of a fraud to which its agent was a party, such money can-
not be held by the United States against the claim of the injured party.
United States v. Bunj', 474.
2. The interposition of equity is not necessary where a trust fund is per-
verted. The cestui que trust can follow it at law as far as it can be traced.
Id.
3. A contract for the purchase of goods on credit, made with intent on the
part of the purchaser not to pay for them, is fraudulent ; and if the purchaser
has no reasonable expectation of being able to pay, it is equivalent to an
intention not to pay. Talcott v. Henderson, 474.
4. But where the purchaser intends to pay and has reasonable expectationa
of being able to do so, fhe contract is not fraudulent, although the purchaser
knows himself to be insolvent and does not disclose it to the vendor, who ie
ignorant of the fact. Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See CHAMPERTY, 4; CONTRACT, 1; SALE, 5.
1. A contract for the sale of land in which the vendor is not named, but is
stated to be "a trustee selling under a trust for sale," is sufficient within
the statute. Marsden v. Kent, 202.
2. Although the parties may be longer than a year in the performance of
a contract, still, if that performance may be completed within a year, such
contract is not within the statute. Blaceney v. Goode, 407.
3. To make a parol contract void, it must appear affirmatively that it was
not to be performed within a year. Walker v. Johnson, 537.
4. A sheriff levied an execution on real estate ; it was bought by T. at
$11,050. T. refused to execute a sale bond, or pay for the land. The land
was resold for $9000. In an action against T. for the difference, it was held,
that the sale was within the statute. Mla'rehouse Co. v. Turrill, 538.
5. Where a coptract for land is executory on both sides, it is necessary
that the sale and the price both be evidenced by a memorandum signed by the
parties to be charged. Id.
6. No action can be maintained to recover back money paid itpon a verbal
contract for the purchase of land. Galway v. Shields, 673.
7. An action may he sustained for breach of a verbal promise of marriage.
It is not within the Stnute of Frauds. Short v. Stotts, 587.
FRAUDULENT DEBTORS. See IN SOLVENcY, 2.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTORNEY, 3; ATTACIMET; DEBTOR AND CREDI-
TOR, 11.
GIFT.
1. The death of a drawee before payment revokes a check given. Simmons
v. Cincinnati Savings Society, 673. See DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS.
2. T. transferred stock to F., a niece of his wife, on the books of a corpo-
ration, but retained the certificates in his possession, and after his death they
were found in an envelope, with his own name and that of F. endorsed there-
on. F. had no knowledge of the transfer. She lived in the family of T.
and was in all respects treated and regardea as his daughter : ]eld, the legal
title was in F. Roberts's Appeal, 738.
.Held further, that the circumstances of the case rebutted the presumption of
a resulting trust. Id.
GOVERNMENT. See UNITED STATES.
INDEX. 829
GUARANTY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 10-15; MUNICIPAL CORORATION, 8;
SURETY, 4-5.
1. A guarantor, in writing, of the payment of a debt when due, will not
he permitted to show by parol that it wa, understood that lie should be liable
only a t guarantor of the collection of the debt. iVeill v. Tr,iters, 538.
2. The contracts of a maker and a guarantor of commercial paper are
separate and distinct, and cannot be joined as one cause of action against
both. (,!e v. Lank, 703.
3. A guaranty written on a negotiable note or bill, addressed to no par-
ticular person, partakes of the negotiable quality of the note, and passes as an
incident to it, to every bomit jifd holder for value. I.
4. A guaranty is assignable in equity, and under the code of Indiana, the
assignee may sue upon it in his own name. Id.
5. The guaranty of the payment of the debt of another, made at the time
the delt is contracted, does not constitute the guarantor and the principal
debtor joint promisors. Dening v. Trustees, 474.
GUARDIAN. See JUDICIAL SALE, 1.
HABEAS CORPUS.
A writ of habeas corpiv; cannot determine the same questions as a writ of
error. In rc Cffien, 407.
IIAR3lOR LINE. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, I.
HIGHWAY.
I. A city is bound only to the exercise of reasonable prudence and dili-
gence in the construction of a step from a higher to a lower sidewalk. Chi-
cago v. Blixby, 276.
2. Power given by a charter of a railroad company to construct its road
across a public highway, upon condition that the same be restored to its for-
mer state, does not authorize the company permanently to appropriate any
portion of the public highway by obstructions which materially interfere with
the public travel. Rfilroad v. Commissioners, 673.
3. The insufficiency of a highway is a question of fact and not one for 'the
opinions of experts. Benedict v. Fond dtt Luc, 738.
HOMESTEAD. See HUSBAND AND WIrE, 6, 17.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6; DEED, 9.
I. .Mfirriage, Divorce and Alihony. See ABATEMENT.
i. Insanitv occurring after marriage is not a cause for divorce, and nothing
which is a consequence of it can lbe. Powell v. Poill, 138.
2. A marriage with an insane person is absolutely void, for want of capa-
city to con.;ent. Id.
3. If a marriage is void by reason of the insanity, no judgment annulling
such marriage is necessary, yet a sentence of nullity in such a case is conduc-
ive to good order. Id.
4. Courts in this country possess in actions for divorce-only the powers con-
"ferred by statute. Bacon v. Bacon, 276.
5. Alitm.ky is not an estate, but an allowance, annual or in gross, out of the
husband's estate, for the nourishment of the wife ; and the court granting it
may from time to time revise its judgment. Id.
6. Upon granting a divorc to the husband by reason of the fault of the
wife, the court has power to decree the sum allowed as alimony to the wife a
lien upon the real estate of the husband, and the homestead may be sold in
satisfaction of said lien. Blankenship v. Blankenshil, 475.
7. Conduct and reputation are sufficient proof of marriage in cases involv-
ing property right,. Proctor v. Bigelow, 407.
8. Marriage is not a contract protected by the constitution of the United
States or any of its amendments. It is a civil status unler the control of the
states, and the existence of the relation and the rights, obligations and duties
arising out of it, are to be determined exclusively by state laws. Frasher v.
State of Teras, 459.
9. The provision of the Texas code, making marriage of a White person to
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a negro an indictable offence, is not repugnant to or avoided by the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States, or the legis-
lation or Congress under them. Frasher v. State !i Texas, 459.
I0. The fact that by the code the penalty is imposed on the white person
only dues not make it obnoxious to the Civil Rights Bill. Id.
11. Marriage is a civil contract, and at commn law when made per verba
de presnti is valid as of common right. Afeister v. Moore, 598.
12. Though a state may by statute declare no marriage valid unless solemn-
ized in a prescribed form, yet such construction will not be given to the law
unless the legislative intention to that effect be plainly expressed. Id.
13. Hence, forms prescribed by statute are treated as directory only, and
a marriage, good at common law, is held valid, notwithstanding tile disregard
of statutory forms, unless the statutes contain express words of nullity. leL
14. A marriage illegal by the law of the domicile is null and void. Sot-
tornayer v. De Barros, 599.
15. A court of equity will protect a husband against a voluntary convey-
ance or settlement by his intended wife of all her estate, to the exclusion of
the husband, made pending an engagement of marriage, without his know-
ledge, even in the absence of express misrepresentation or deceit, and whether
the husband knew of the existence of the property or not. Ciandler V. Hol-
Zinqs.corth, 309.
16. The wife's right of dower will he protected against the voluntary con-
veyance of the husband, made pending a marriage enga'ement, under the
same circumstances in which the husband is relieved against an antenuptial
settlement by the wife. Id.
I. Curtesy and Dower. See LEGA CT, 1.
17. The surviving husband or wife cannot enjoy at the same time both
dower or curtesy and homestead in the real estate of decedent, and must elect
which of those rights he or she will take. 13ttefield v. lMicks, 65.
18. Tile continued occupancy of the property by the husband will be re-
garded as an election to hold it as a homestead. Id.
19. The right of occupancy and possession by the survivor confers no title
to the property, and he cannot execute a valid mortgage thereon. Id.
20. Rights of dower are barred by the statute of limitations. Proctor v.
Bigelow, 407.
21. A widow's election to take her dower instead of a legacy in lieu
thereof, made under a mistake as to her rights, may be revoked, annc pro
tunc, if it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others. Maclft v.
M41acknet, 538.
22. When dower is to be assigned in estates aliened by the husband, the
widow is to be endowed according to their value at the time of the as~ign-
ment, deducting the enhancement by the purchaser's improvements, but allow-
ing for all other increase in value. Mlescott v. Campbdl, 136.
I. Separate Estate. See ihfra 32, 33, 41 ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6.
23. A settlement by a husband who is not in debt and not in contempla-
tion of any new or unusual busihess ventures, of a part of his estate, not
exceeding one-sixth of the whole, upon his wife, is valid. Jones v. Clifton,
713.
24. Such a settlement is not invalid because not made in due legal form by
the intervention of a trustee. Id.
25. Nor is such settlement made invalid by the insertion of a power of
revocation in the husband. Id.
26. The exercise of the power of revocation in favor either of himself or of
a stranger would terminate the separate estate of the wite and subject the
property to the claims of the settlor's creditors. But an assignment in bank-
ruptcy by the settlor is not an exercise of the power of revocation, nor does
it pass that power to his assignee. Id.
27. Powers of revocation and appointment over property within a volun-
tary settlement, even though such as may be exercised by a bankrupt for his
own benefit, do not pass by an assignment or an adjudication in bankruptcy ;
INDEX.
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nor will equity compel tile bankrupt to execute them for the benefit of the
a,-niOee. .Ions v. Clil'on, 713.
2Q. A voluntary conveyance of land made by a husband to hik wife. will
not he held void as to future creditors on the mere ground that the husband
silequently iecatne in'olvent. Eraes v. Lewis, 202.
29. Suh courevance will be set asile at the suit of a subsequent creditor,
only on proof that it was umade with intent on the part of the grantor thereby
to defraud such subsequent creditor or crediors. Id.
30. One havin, a valid taue of action sounding in tort, against such
grantor, at the time of such conveyance, uporr which an action was subse-
qiteutly brought and judgment recovered, is to be regarded as a subsevn,at
cr, oltor. Id.
31. Iu order to charge the debts contracted by a married woman upon her
separate estate as a lien in equity, it is necessary that it should appear that
her contract was made with direct reference to her separate estate. lVilnoa
v. Jonev, 407.
IV ",titracts, Conweyances and Liabilities.
;32. In the statute which declares that a married woman "may receive by
grant," the word grant includes deeds of bargain and sale of land. Jfc 1'ey
v. Rdir, Co., 138.
33. Where a conveyance is made by a stranger to a married woman, the
presumption is that the consideration was paid by her, and not by her has-
band. id.
34. A statute providing that husband and wife may convey the wife's land
by deed, signed, sealed and delivered by them, respectively, a (teed drawn as
the in livi lual deed of a married woman, throughout, down to the attestation
cl u ue, which read, " In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands
an I secals," sined, sealed and acknowledged, by both husband and wife, the
wfe'. acknowledgment being separately taken : Jlid, that the deed was a
nullity. vWarner v. Peck, 202.
35. One who signs a note or bond with a married woman, is the only party
bounu I, auol hii being a surety makes no difference in the liability. Unangst
v. F,?lee, 202.
3G. The husb-ind is liable for tecesaries furnished a wife who for sufficient
hrase Ms left hii be I an b) tr 1. Thorp, v. Shapleigh, 340.
37. The articlei furnished must be necessaries, regard being had to the
condition of the parties, else no recovery can be had. Id.
31. A wife after a separation from her husband has no implied authority to
ple 14e his era lit. E tstl vid v. Burchell, 794.
39. Where an action is against husband and wife for a tort committed by
tie wife, the liability of the husband necessarily follows from the existence
of the marital relation, al I when this is not disputed, a verdict that the wife
is gtilty disposes of the whole issue raised by a joint plea of not guilty.
Fec,'gso. v. Bcaao'.:, 341.
40. The presumption th-tt in case of tort committed by the wife in the pres-
ence of the husband the wife is under coercion, is not conclusive. Id.
41. The ancient doctrine that a married woman cannot bQ a trespasser by
prior or subseuent assent, is so far modified by statutes giving them the
power to manage and control their own property, that as to all acts done in
their name and behalf for the enforcement.of their supposed rights in such
property, they are responsible, like other parties not under disability, for
what they authorize or ratify. Id.
INDIAN COUNTRY. See OFFICER. 5.
INDICTMENT. See CRItINAL LAw, 7-13, 34, 35.
INFANT.
1. Infancy is a bar to an action on the ease for falce and fraudulent repre-
sent.t'ons by a vendor a- pledgor as to his ownership of property sold or
pledged. Doran v. S:nith, 42.
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2. Liability of minor when there is a combination of a contract and a tort,
discussed. Vote to Doran v.'Sinith, 44.
3. An undertaking by an infant as surety for the stay of execution is not
void, but only voidable, and when ratified by him after arriving at majority,
becomes a valid contract. ilarner v. Dipple, 708.
INJUNCTION. See WATERS, 3.
1. A suitor who seeks to have a public improvement enjoined must apply
-promptly, show an invasion of a clear right, and that he ies no other ade-
quate remedy. Traphagen v. Jersey City, 538.
2. A suitor who by laches has made it impossible for the court to enjoin his
adversary without inflicting great injury upon him, will bc refused aid. Id.
3. The writ of injunction does not issue of right, but is discretionary, its
purpose being to stay evils the consequences of which could not adequately
be compensated in damages. Edwards v. .311niny Co., 475.
4. Generally, courts have no concern with a party's motives in doing any
lawful act; but where one invokes the aid of equity, averring that, under the
peculiar circumstances of his case, the rules of the common law do not afford
him adequate redress, it may be inquired how he came to be placed in such
circumstances. Id.
5. Where a party bought lands on the banks of a stream, with the sole
purpose of forcing their repurchase at a great advance by the proprietor of a
costly quartz-mill above, held, that complainant's motives in purchasing
might be inquired into, and that instead of granting an injunction, the court
would leave complainant to his remedy in danages. Id.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 17-19 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1-3; INsuR-
ANCE, 20; LUNATIC.
1. When the mind is so deranged that a person cannot understand the
effects and consequences of an act, the law will relieve him ; but so long as
he is possessed of the requisite mental faculties to transact rationally the
ordinary affairs of life, he will not be relieved from responsibility. Titcomb
v. 'antyle, 277.
2; Where a purchase from an insane person is made, and a conveyance
obtained in good faith, for a sufficient consideration, the consideration must be
returned before the conveyance will be avoided. Scanlan v. Cobb, 705. -
3. Partial insanity does not, as a general rule, render a testator incapable
of making a will, unless the insanity enters into or affects the will itself.
Eggers v. Eggers, 383.
4. But under a statute which declares that no person of "unsound mind"
shall be capable of making a will, the phrase "aJ/ "n.round mind" includes
every species of partial insanity and avoids a will made by a person partially
insane, although the will was not the offspring of the insanity. Id.
5. An instruction that the opinions of medical experts upon mental un-
soundness based upon hypothetical cases "are of no value unless the hypo-
thetical cases are fulljk sustained by the evidence given in the cause," is erro-
neous. Id.
INSOLVENCY. See CONFLICT OP LAWS, 1; FRAUD, 4.
1. State insolvent laws are not superseded by the Bankrupt Act of Con-
gress. Burrill v. Hevener, 371.
2. The Pennsylvania Act of 1 842, for the arrest of fraudulent debtors, is
in force, and the courts will* enforce the act until proceedings in bankruptcy
are actually commenced. Id.
INSURANCE.
I. Generally.
1. If an insurance company, with notice of facts renderingthe policy void-
able at its option, objects upon other grounds only to proofs of loss furnished,
and subjects the insured to trouble and expense in furnishing new proofs, it
will be estopped from setting up such facts in avoidance of the policy. Gans
v. Ins Co., 407.
2. Proofs of death furnished in compliance with a requirement of the policy
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were oflircd in evidence by the plaintiff, for the purpose of showing such
compliance. .IW. lt. That the same were admissible for that purpose and
for no other, and their sufficiency was; a question for thc court to determine.
2d. That the said prnof. being also offered in evidence by the defendant,
were adinkihlc its declrations of tie plaintiff. Ins. Co. v. Stibbe, 408.
3. The sta ement of the plaintiff as to the cause of the death (lid not pro-
perly co.titute any part of the proof of death required by the policy, but
waq a mere declaration, and is such the defendant was entitled to rely upon
it thcuzh not conclusive. 1d.
4. The statement of the physician was, that the disease of which the insured
died, was 4 cerhrid conge t ion, caused proximately by mental anxiety and
remotelv by drink." By the terms of the policy, it was to be void, "1 if the
death shall be caused by the use of intoxicating drink or opium." Hdd,
that the thingq prohihited should be the direct cause of the death, in order to
avoid the policy. Id.
5. The preliminary proofs presented to an insurance company, in compli-
ance with the conditions of the policy, are admissible as priua facie evidence
of the facts stated therein against the insured. Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham,
358.
6. Where it is the practice of an inzurance company to allow its agents to
extenud the time for payment of premiums, it is proper to submit evidence of
such a practice to the jury. Insurance Co. v. Norton, 599.
7. If the agreement to extend he made before the note given for the pre-
mium matures, and before the forfeiture is incurred, it would be a fraud upon
the insured to attempt to enforce the forfeiture when, relying on the agree-
ment, he permits the original day of payment to pass. Id.
II. Connditions, Representations, etc.
8. It was stipulated, that if the property insured should be sold or trans-
ferred, or any change made in its title, without the assent of the company
insuring, the policy should be void. The assured sold and conveyed the pro-
perty for an agreed sum, to be paid in the future, the company assenting to
the sale, but without knowledge of its terms. To secure the payment of the
purchase price, the purchaser, at the time of the sale, and as a part of its
terms, executed a mortgage of the property to the vendor. Held, that the
assent given by the company to said sale was an assent to the terms upon
which the same was made, and that the execution of said mortgage did not
avoid the policy. Insurance Co. v. Aslton, 674.
9. Where the whole of a premium note payable in instalments becomes
due upon failure to pay any instalment for thirty days, but such failure does
not absolutely avoid the policy, but suspends'it so that tie company is not
liable for a loss occurring (luring the continuance of such default, but upon
the payment of the nmte (whether volmtarily or enforced) the, policy revives
and re-attaches, in such case the company may recover the full amount of the
note, anl thereupon the insured becomes the owner of a paid-up policy for
the remainder of the original term. Insurance Co. v. Klink, 277.
10. A stipulation in the charter of an insurance company requiring all
suits to be brought on policies issued by the company within twelve months
from the date of loss is operative and binding. Glass v. li'dkcer, 599.
11. Where the contract of insurance on a steamboat contains a "1 per-
mission to navigate the Ohio and Mississippi. rivers below Cairo," but con-
tains no condition expressly avoiding the policy for navigating the boat
outside of the permitted waters, anl the boat made a trip outside of these per-
mitted waters and returned in safety, where sie was afterward destroyed by
fire, 11l4, The policy was not avoided Villeins v. Insurance Company, 599.
12. An in-urance company issued a policy against fire for five years, the
insured paying the first year's premium in cash, and giving his note promis-
ing to pay it sum named on March 1st of the succeeding year, a similar sum
on the same tiny 6f the next year, and so on for the four years. The policy
containedi a clause that, in case of default of payment of any instalment of
the premiums due upon this note for thirty days, the insurer should not be
liable, and the policy should become void, but that, upon payment the policy
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should revive, and the liability of the insurer again attach, &c.: Held, that
the policy was voidable at the option of the insurer only; that the premium
note was not void or voidable by the insured, and he could not escape hik
liability upon it by making default, and that, at the end of the five years,
the insurer could recover the amount of the note. Insurance Comopany v.
lleng, 778.
13. A policy of life insurance having been determined by the failure to pay
the premium falling due July 16th, the insured, on October ist, applied-for a
reinstatement of the policy, gave a physician's certificate as to his health,
and paid the-premium to an agent, who forwarded the application and cer-
tificate to the company. The company reinstated the policy and sent its
receipt, dated as of the preceding July 16th, to the agent, who, on October
14th, delivered it to the insured. Hdd, that the representation of the insured
as to his health on Octobe' 1t was not continuous, and that in the absence
of any representations on the 14th, a failure to commuuicate any change of
condition of health between the Ist and that date did not constitute a mis-
.representation. Insurance Company v. IKigyhiiothain, 358.
14. Effect and duration of representations made in the course of negotia-
tions for insurance. Id. Note, 367.
15.- A policy of insurance provided as follows "If the interest of the
insured in the property be any other than. the entire, unconditional and sole
ownership of the property for the use and beneft of the insured, or if. the
buildings insured stand on leased ground, it must be so represented to the
company and be so expressed in the written part of the policy, otherwise the
policy shall be void." It was admitted at the trial that the insured were the
owners in fee of the land where the buildings stood at the time of the fire.
Held, that a failure to disclose a lease of the property did not avoid the policy.
Ins. Co. v. Haven, 203.
III. Marine. Seesupra 11.
16. The clause in a policy, "the riskto be suspended while vessel is at
Baker's Island loading," construed to mean, "while the vessel is at Baker's
Island for the purpose of loading. Reed v. Ins. Co., 65.
IV. Life. See supra, 2-5, 13.
17. A policy of life insurance is a chose in action. Clark v. Allen, 83. "
- 18. The sale and assignment of a life policy, outstanding and valid, and
containing no prohibition of such alienation, is good, though made to one
who has no interest in the- life insured, provided such sale and assignment is
a bonafide business transaction, and not a device to evade law. Id.
19. "The extent of the right of a creditor to insure the life of his debtor.
Id. Note, 86.
20. It is not every kind or delree of insanitywhich will so far excuse the
party taking his own life as to make the company insuring liable : to do this,
the act of self-destruction must have been the consequence of insanity, and
the mind of the deceased must have been so far deranged as to have.made him
incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was
committing. Insurance Company v. Rode!, 138.
V. Fire.
21. In an.aetion.on -a policy of insurance against loss by fire, where the
defence is that the property insured was wilfully burned by the assured, the
rule in civil, and not in criminal .cases, as to the quantum of proof, applies.
Kane-v. Insuranee Co., 293.. See EvsnEcE, 16.
22. Policy provided.that defendant should iy to the assured "any loss or
damage by fireto the buildings" not exceeding 16001. The premises were
afterwards required by the Metropolitan Board of Works, under their com-
i pulsory powers, in order that they miglht he pulled down for the improvement
of a street, and the amount-of purchase-money payable to the plaintiff was
assessed by arbitration., After the. board had accepted the plaintiff's title,
but before he had executed a conveyance, the premises were destroyed by
- fire :. Hdd, that the -deflendants .were liable to pay the plaintiff the full value
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of the buildings at the time of the fire. Colliugridge v. Assurance Corpora-"
lion, 739.
23. Policies of fire insurance are contracts whereby the insurers nndertake
for a stipulated sum to indemnify the insured against loss or damage by fire
to ani amount not exceeding the sum specified in the written contract. Ins.
(.o. v. 1I(trn, 203.
INTEREST. See EXECUTOR, 2, 3. NATIONAL BANK, 3.
1. When a note is given on time, with interest higher than the legal rate,
the holder, after maturity, receives interest by operation of law and not under
the contract. Duran v. Aytr, 341.
2. A contract to pay a sum named in ten years, "with interest annually
at seven per cent. per annum until paid," means that the interest is due and
payable each year. tinling v. C1enmcr, 642.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18, 19; Cow-
TRACT, 8; OFFICER, 6.
INTOXICATION. See CRIMINAL LAW, 19, 39 ; INSURANCE, 4; WILL, 6-8.
JOINDER OF ACTIONS. See GUARANTY,'2, 5.
JOINT DEBTORS.
1. A joint defendant is liable to the full extent of the judgment. Painer
v. Sltarg, 66.
2. Where a judgment was obtained against a town for injuries.caused by
the negligence of the co-defendant, the plaintiff is not compelled to resort to
the property of the latter. 1d.
3. ie may ask a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax for the'
payment of the judgment. Id.
4. It is no objection to the granting of the writ that it will promote a cir-
cuity of actions. Id.
JUDGMENT. See ASSIGNMENT, I ; ATTORNEY, 4; EQUITY, 12; FORMER
ADJUDICATION ; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 7 ; LUNATIC ; SURETY, .2;
UNITED STATES COURTS, 3, 4.
1. A judgnent can only bind property *ithin the jurisdiction of the court.
arris v. Pullman, 277.
2. Parol evidcflce is admissible to show that certain matters as to which a
judgment is silent, were not adjudicated. Street v. Maupin, 341.
3. A scire facias against terre-tenants, is, so far as they are concerned, apro-
ceeding strictly in ren, and it is essential that the land should be properly
described. Tiunas v. Ftrners' Bank" of 11faryIand, 341.
4. Where in a scire facias against terre-tenants, there is n. sufficient
description of the lands appearing of record, the court cannot resort to the
evidence offered to the jury for the purpose of obtaining a, description of the
lands against which to render the judgment. Id.
5. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction may beimpeached even in a
collateral proceeding, Afastin v. Duncan, 564.
6. The want of jurisdiction, by reason of the party sued not having notice
of the action, may be shown by parol evidence, even in a collateral proceed-
ing. l.
7. And such evidence is admissible to contradict the return of a sheriff or
other officer set out on the record. Id.
8. A judgment cannot be xendered against one out of the jurisdiction of
the court. Godfrey v. 7 rry, 795.
9. It is no fraud on the part of the holter of several judgments to sell
naler a junior judgment, notifying bidders of the lien of those which are
ohler. lfrdt'irk v. ;Yo.e;, 339.
10. A note is not merged in a judgment rendered thereon in an action
commenced by attachment where defendant was not personally served, and
did not appear, and where no part of the judgment has been satisfied. Sith
v. Curtiss, 674.
11. The negligence of attorneys in failing to interpose a defence where a
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valid one existed, does not constitute a sufficient ground for disturbing a
judgment. Jones v. Lrech, 539.
12. Where judgments assigned arc cancelled by fraud and mistake, caused
by defendants' misrepresentations to the plaintiff's attorney, the cancellation
will be vacated. Keogh v. Delany, 674.
JUDICIAL SALE.
1. The purchaser of real estate at guardian's sale has no right to infer
from the guardian's assurance that he will give a good title, that lie i'; acquir-
ing a title in fee simple, and such assurance being given in good faith, the
purchaser is not entitled to equitable relief. Fimlley v. Richardson, .539.
2. The purchaser having acquired all ihe interest of the ward in the land,
cannot refuse to pay a promissory note given for the purchase-money on the
ground of a failure of consideration. Id.
3. The rule of caveat emptor applies to all sales of real estate made under
judgments, after confirmation. As there is no warranty of title there can be
no relief for defects. Farmers' Bank v. Peter, 539.
JURISDICTION. See JUDGMENT, 6-8; PATENT, 6.
1. Where an action, local in its nature, is founded on two things done in
several counties, and both are material and traversable, and neither will alone
support the action, it may be brought in either county. Pilgrim v. Mtellor,
729.
2. Where a dan built in one county causes an overflow of land in another,
the owner of the land may bring his action in either county. Id.
JUROR AND JURY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 23; CRIMINAL LAw, 14;
VERDICT, 5.
1. On the trial of the validity of a challenge alleged against a juror, other
than a principal challenge, a sound discretion is allowed to the court. Dew
v. M Divitt, 621.
2. If a juror has formed an opinion in relation to a portion of the facts
embraced in the issue, but not upon the whole issue, and, otherwise, stands
indifferent between the parties, the allowance or refusal of the challenge is
within the discretion of the court. Id.
3. Challenge to the favor discussed. Id. Note, 624.
4. It is the duty of the courts to enforce a rigid observance of the pro-
visions of the statutes designed to preserve inviolate the right of trial by jury.
State v. Snider, 739.
5. The presence of an unauthorized perscn during the deliberation of the
jury is ground for setting the verdict aside and granting a new trial. Id.
LABORER. See SERVANT.
LACHES. See AGENT, 9; INJUNCTION, 1, 2.
.LANI). See TENEMENT.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See EQUITY, 6.
1. The tenant's leaving the keys with the landlord, and the latter's effort
to rent the land, will not constitute a surrender. Oastler v Benderson, 203.
2. A landlord who has parted with possession to a tenant in occupation, is
not responsible for injuries from defective condition of such premises arising
during the continuance of the lease. Stindlebeck v. Moon, 450.
3. A lessee remains liable on his express agreement to pay rent, notwith-
standing he may have assigned his lease with the lessor's assent, and the
lessor has accepted rent from the assignee. Lodqe v. White, 600.
4. But where the obligation of the lessee is only that which is implied by
law from his occupation of the premises, his surrender of possession, with the
assent of the lessor, extinguishes his liability. Id.
5. A lessor may maintain an action for rent against his lessee, on an
express covenant to pay rent during the term, though the rent accrued after
the lessee had assigned all his interest in the leasehold estate and the lessor
had accepted rent from the assignee of the term. Taylor v. DeBus, 674.
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6. In monthly tenancies, a month's notice to quit is sufficient. Stetfens v.
Earl, 600.
7. A notice must be to quit at the end of one of the recurring periods of
holding, but a notice to quit on the day corresponding with the date of letting
and entry is sufficient. Id.
8. Where no time is mentioned, tile character of the tenure, as to time,
will be controlled by the intervals between the payments. Md.
9. Where one takes a renewal or a lease, having previous to doing so a
right; to remove fixtures which he had erected, he do3s not lose this right by
the renewal unless the terms of the lease are inconsistent with it. Kerr v.
Kiqli'mr/l, 638.
10. A mortgagee takes with constructive notice of the rights of occupants.
Where, therefore, a mortgage was given while the mortgfigor was occupying
tile premises in partnership with a third person, and carrying on business in
buildings erected thereon, and it turned out that in fact the lands had previ-
ously been conveyed away by the mortgagor by a (Iced not recorded, and. that
he and his partner occupied under a lease from the real owner : IIdd, that
the mortgagee could not hold tenant's fixtures as against a subsequent
assignec. of the partnership. Id.
LARCENY. See CRUMINAL LAW, V.
LATERAL SUPPORT. See EASEMENT, 6.
LEGACY AND LEGATEE. See ACTION, 12; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 21.
A pecuniary bequest in lieu of dower is not subject to abatement for defi-
ciency. Potter v. Brown, 204.
LIBEL.
1. An action will not lie for statements containm..l in an answej alleged to
be libellous, if such statements were honestly made, without malice, upon
probale caus-, and tinder advice of counsel. Lannin!! v. Christg, 204.
2. In an action for libel where the occasion is privileged, it is for the
plaintiff to establish that the statements complained of were made from an
indirect motive. Clark v. 11olpmux, 795.
3. In an action for libel, it is error to allow the plaintiff to offer succes.
sively in evidence, articles published in defendant's newspaper suhsequent to
the time of publication of the article complained of. Scripps v. r]eily, 674.
4. The burden of proving carelessness or negligence on the part (,f a
newspaper proprietor in the selection or retention of his employees, is upon
the plaintiff. Id.
5. Where the act done is one which, from its very nature, must be expected
to result in mischief, damages are allowed for the injury to, th, feelings of the
plaintiff, but where no element of malice or gross neglect is chown to have
existed, the damage will be reduced to such sum as must inzvitably have
resulted from the wrong itself, Id.
6. An averment, in libel, that the defendant, " composed, uttered, wrote
and sent" certain words concerning the plaintiff, sufficiently avers publication.
Benedict v. Rrstorer, 739.
7. It is defamatory to call a person who has been convicted of felony "a
convicted felon," if he has received a pardon or suffered his sentence. Ley-
mai v. Lathner, 739.
LIEN. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 31 ; JUDGMENT, I ; MORTGAGE, 5, 6 ; UNI-
TED STATES COURTS, 4; VENDOR, 4.
1. The law in reference to the lien of laborers discussed. Note to ilerries
v. Norrell, 101.
2. The lien at common law of the vendor of personal property to secure
the payment of purchase-money is lost by the unconditional delivery of the
property to the purchaser, but this does not prevent the parties from contract-
ing for a lien which, as between themselves, will be good after delivery.
Greqorq v. Morris, 601.
3. Lien laws are to be construed strictly. Wa gare v. Briscoe, 740.
4. A lien for repairs is not, available by third parties. Bodine v. Simmons,
795.
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LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20.
I. bV4iere a statute or limitations has once begun to run, no subsequent dis-
ability in the party against whom it is taking effect will arrest its operation.
Keil v. lealey, 278.
2. A forcible entry of a claimant into the possession of the premises sued
for does not have the effect of suspending the operation of the statute in favor
of an adverse claimant. Ferguson v. larh omcw, 495.
3. The maxim nullum tempus occurit rcgi applies to sovereignty alone, which
means, in this country, the United States and the States themselves in their
public capacity. Wheeling v. Campbell, 386.
4. The statute runs against a municipal corporation. Id.
5. A conditional promise is not sufficient to take a case out of the statute.
Goldsmith v. Kilbourn, 409.
6. An act providing that, "where a party has been kept in ignorance by the
fraud of the adverse party, the right to bring the 0 uit shall be deemed to have
first accrued at the time at which such fraud shall, cr, with usual and ordi-
-nary diligence, might, have been known or discovered.? ' Held, that it was
not thereby meant that a party must commit a fraud distinct from the original
fraud. Vear v. Sknner, 409.
7. The statute for the action to recover possession of land is not applicable
to the lien of a judgment creditor on the land, though the judgment debtor
may sell and convey the land with pdssession to the party setting up the sta-
tute. Pratt v. Pratt, 539.
8. The statute does not begin to run in such case until the land has been
sold under the judgment and the purchaser becomes entitled to a deed. Id.
9. A credit upon an account after the riuse of action on the same is barred
by the Statute of Limitations, will not be treated as part payment tbereolf
unless shown to have been so intended by the parties. Kaufman. Adm'r v.
lBrougkon, 675.
10. The formal language -ina will requiring that all the just debts should
be paid, caninot be invoked in behalf of a person who neglects the legal proof
of his demand until the period of settlement has elapsed. Collamore v. Wil-
.der, 135. t
LIS PENDENS.
1. The pendency of a former action to be pleadable in abatement of a
second action must be in a domestic court, that is, in a court of the state in
which the second action has been brought. Insurance Co. v. Harris, 601. See
UNITED STATES COURTS, 3.
2. The plea of a suit pending in equity in a -foreign jurisdiction will not
abate a suit at law in a domestic tribunal. Id.
3. All persons dealing with property are bound to take notice of a suit
pending with regard to the title thereof. But this rule is not of universal
application. It does not apply to negotiable securities purchased before ma-
turity, nor to articles of ordinary commerce sold in the usual way. Marren
v. Marcg, 796.
LOCAL ACTION. See JUISDICTION.
LOCAL OPTION. See CONSTITUTIO AL LAw, 18, 19.
LUNATIC. See DEED, 8 ; IN SANITY.
1. A judgment rendered .against an insane person, without the interven-
tion of a trustee or guardian, is not void. Johnson v. Pomeroy, 540.
2. In a proceeding in aid of execution, such judgment cannot be impeached
without showing some fraud on the part of the creditor in obtaining the judg-
ment. Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. An action on the case will lie for the malicious prosecution of a civil
suit without probable cause, although there was neither an attachment nor an
arrest. lVood v. Finnell, 689.
2. In such a ease the fees of counsel, the expenses of witnesses, and all the
reasonable expenses incurred in the defence of the malicious suit, in excess
of the ordinary costs, should constitute the measure of damages. Id.
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3. The removal from one jurisdietion to another for the avowed purpose of
bringing an action in the latter forum, does not raise any presumption of a
want of probable cause. W0ood v. Fin,(ll, 689.
4. Costs in malicious prosecution discussed. Id. Mote, 693.
MANI)AM.IUS. See JOINT )EnTOltS, 3, 4; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 5;
OrricE, 3, 4; RAILROAD, 8.
1. A private citizen has the right to compel by mandamus a performance
of its duty by a public corporation. l"utnphreil v. llyor, 540.
2. Where county commissioners authorized by special act to build a bridge,
for reasons in their judgment sufficient, ahanloned the purpose of building
the bridge, and declined to make further levies, Ifld, that they will not be
compelled. tate v. C0u'nuiision.rs, 475.
3. The court will not issue a writ against a public body when it is clearly
shown that the performance of the duty i impossible, by Want of funds not
involving any default on the part of such body. The Bristol and NVorth Som-
erset Rdlwlq Co., 740.
4. A mandanus is not available to enforce contract rights of private na-
ture. Parrott v. City. of Bridgporl, 139.
5. It is granted only to prevent a failure of justice in cases where ordinary
legal processes furnish no relief. Id.
MANSLAUGHTER. See CRIMINAL LAw, VI.
MARITIME LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, III.
IARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
AIASTEI AND SERVANT. See CONTRACT, 15, 16 ; RAILROAD, 5, 6 ; SER-
VANT; UNITED STATES.
1. A barge of the defendant being unlawfully navigated on the river T.,
the plaintiff, a waterman, complained to the man in charge, who referred him
to R., the defendant's foreman ; the lilaintiff went to the defendant's wharf
in order to speak to R., and whilst he was there a bale of goods, by the negli-
gence of the defendant's servants, fell upon him and injured him ; the plain-
tiff had had no warning that the bale might fall. Hdd, that the plaintiff was
entitled to maintain an action for the injuries sustained by him. Corby v.
f l/, 66.
2. The plaintiff, a workman in the employ of a contractor engaged by the
defendants, had to work in a dark tunnel rendered dangerous by the passing
of trains. After he had been working a fortnight he wa, injured by a pass-
ing train. I11d, that plaintiff having continued in his employment with full
knowledge, could not make the defendants liable. lWoodleyq v. .Railwaj Co.,
67.
3. Where the incompetency of an engineer employed by the defendant was
alleged to have been the cause of an injur-, proof tht he was afterward dli-
chargel by defendant was not competent evidence to support such allegation.
Couch v. lJrtsw (Joal Co., 541.
4. The superintendent of the company was in such case properly allowed
to state whether in .his opinion the engineer was competent, without previously
showing himself to be an expert. Id.
5. Evidence of specific acts of negligence before the injury on the part of
the engineer would be admissible as tending to establish the negligence of
the defendant in continuing to employ him. 1l.
6. The master is liable for an injury to a servant, resulting from the neg-
ligence of a superior servant while the latter is discharging the duties of one
under his control to the same extent as if the act causing the injury had been
committed by an inferior servant under his directions. Berea -Stoae Co. v.
Krald, 676.
7. It is the duty of employers to use ordinary care and diligence in pro-
viding sufficient and safe machinery for their employees, nnd if they know
that machinery waq defective and dangerous, and permit it to be used, they
are responsible in damages, unless the defect w~.s known by the employee.
Qtaid v. Cornwall, 601.
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8. If the employer had actual knowledge of the defective machinery, then
lie would be liable, unless he warned the employee of his danger. Quaid v.
Cornwall, 601.
9. In an action against a corporation for destruction of life by wilful ne-
glect, Held, that evidence conducing to show that defective machinery was in
use, was not only competent, but that the jury would have been warranted in
finding from such evidence alone that the killing was the result of wilflul
neglect. Claxton v. Railroad Co., 602.
10. A railroad company is liable for injury to an employee caused by a
defect in one of its cars, which the company, in the exercise of ordinary care,
would have discovered ant remedied. Wedgewrnod v. Railway Co., 740.
11. If a servant, without his master's consent, engage in any employment
or business for himself which may tend to injure the master's trade, lie may
lawfully be discharged before the expiration of the agreed term of service,
eien though he may so conduct such other business that it does not interfere
with the business of his employer. Dieringer v. Heyers, 139.
12. A principal is liable in compensatory damages for injuries done by
his servant acting withlm the seope of his employment; and if the act is such
that the servant would be liable in punitory damages, if the action were
against him, the principal is liable in damages of that character in case he
authorized the act or suhbsequently ratified it, but not otherwise. Bass v. G.
4- N. W. Railway Co., 139.
13. Plaintiff,, a passenger upon a train of the defendant company, was
seized by a brakeman and forcibly ejected from the car : Held, that the injury
was one which, in -an action against the brakeman, would sustain a verdict
for punifory damages, and notice to the conductor of the train was iotice to
the company ; and if the conductor or co mpany disbelieves the charge against
the brakeman, still the retention of the latter in its service by the company
will be at its peril -of the fact. Id.
14. The servant of the occupants of an upper tenement accidentally left
open a faucet, thereby causing the water to overflow and flood the tenement
below. Held, that the occupants of the upper tenement were liable for the
damage thereby done. ' Simon!on v. Loring, 795.
MERGER. See JUDGMENT, 10.
The assignee of a mortgage, acquiring the equity of redemption, may keep
alive such mortgage as a part of his title. Insurance Co. v. Meeker, 602.
MILL. See WATEPS AND WATERCOURSE, 2, 3.
MINES AND MINING.
1. A tenant for life may, when not precluded by restraining words, work
open mines to exhaustion. Westmore!and Coal Co.'s Appeal, 741.
2. The term "mine," when applied to coal, is equivalent to a worked vein,
and a tenant for life may pursue it to the boundaries of the tract. Id.
3. Where there are two different tracts separated by an intervening tract
owned by another, with a vein extending beneath them, the opening on one
tract does not extend to the other, and the tenant for life mining under the
unopened one is guilty of waste. Id.
4. The lease of a coal mine stipulated that the Tessee was to leave the
mine in good working condition. Held, that lie could not remove the sup-
ports and pillars from the mine. Randolph v. I~o'de,, 67.
5. A contract cannot be controlled by a custom which the parties have ex-
cluded. Id.
MISNOMER. See AGENT, 11 ; CHARITY, 7.
MSTAKE. See DEED, 10-13;.EQUITY, 3-6, 13, 16; MORTGAGE, 13.
MORTGAGE. See DEBTOR AND CnEDIToR. 7. 8: EJECTMENT, 1 ; HUSBAND
AND WIFE. 19 : LANDLORD AND TENANT, 10 ; MERGER; PossEssIoN, 2;
RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 4; TENDER, 3; VERDICT, 3-4.
. Of 'hattels. See infra, 7, 8.
1. A mortgage of personal property to be subsequently acquired convey"
no title to such property when acquired which is valid against the mortgagor
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or his voluntary assignce, unlc-s after acquisition, possession of such property
is given to tile miortgagee. II lhiais v. B,'tyys. 140.
2. Where a chattel mortgage not securing negotiable paper is given fir a
sum named, but really to secure future advances, and none have been matde,
an assignee, though fbr value. has no rights superior to those of the mortgagee.
.uldge v. Vogel, 735.
3. Because a mortgagee of a chattel temporarily uses it with the assent of
of the mortgagor, and then returns it to him, the mortgage lien upon it is
not thereby extingisheil. .1l111t v. Liudal, 409.
4. A chattel mortu;tge and a written agreement to govern the same subject
matter between the partia, executted contemporanCously, mnust he treated as
one contract. I31a'.esl,,t Y. Js.¢,,, 409.
5. Where such a contract mortgages to creditors a merchant's entire stock
of goods, licensing the mortgagor to remain in possession antm apply one-half
of the proceed; of tile sale upon his liabilitv to the mortgagees, without nmak-
ing any provision for the disposition of the other halt; this in effect leaves
such other halfat the absolute disposal of the mortgagor for his own use. Id.
6. A chattel mortgage permitting the.mortgagor to remain in possession,
and to sell anil apply the proceeds or any part of them, to his own use, is
fraudulent and void in law as against creditors. Id.
I1. Q/ R., aly.
7. A mortgagee of real estate whose debt is tite, but who has not entered
into possession, cannot maintain replevin for a specific chattel, severed and
removed from the realty, subject to the mortgage. Kircher v. Sclalk, 140.
S. Fixtures put in by lessees of a mortgaged building, who afterwards
purchase the reversion, become subject to the mortgage if its terms are broad
enough to cover them. .Jones v. Dtroil Chair Co., 476.
9. A mortgage contained a stipulation that upon default, an attorney's fee
of fffty dollars for foreclostre, with costs, shouhl be taxed against the mort-
gagor. After suit bro.glit. but before decree, the mortgagor paid the debt,
interest and cost,;, ant judgment for tile fifty dollars attorney fee was refused.
,Jenninqs v. McKag, 140.
10. In a foreclosure the complainant cannot make a person who claims
adversely to both mortgagor and mortgagee a party and litigate his rights.
Dial v. Rl?/nolds, 476.
11. In the suit of sundry mortgagees to foreclose it appeared that the wife
of the mortgagor had united in the execution of only one of the mortgages.
At the instance of the mortgagee holding such release the wife was made a
party, anti the premises were sold pursuant to an order, free from her contin-
gent claim to (lower: Ifeld, that the mortgagee holding such release is
entitled to priority as to the proportionate value of such inchoate dower.
.A un'r of Black %. Kuhlman, 410.
12. Where, in marshalling liens, the court awards to a portion of a claim
secured by mortgage, priority over a subsequent mortgage, but finds that the
residue of the claim secured by the prior mortgage is fraudtlent and void, as
against the lien of the subsequent mortgage, the partial preference thus given
to the elder lien is not necessarily erroneous. Where no positive illegality
enters into the consideration of a claim, it may be valid in part, and in part
invalid. Id.
13. Where a purchaser of land finds a mortgage satisfied of record and on
the faith of that record ansl without actual notice of any mistake pays his
money, lie takes a title clear of the mortgage, although it turns out that the
entry of satisfaction was a mistake which would be rectified between the par-
ties. Ayres v. Itn|s, 634.
14. A conveyance to secure payment of money is a mo'tgago, and a power
of sale contained therein must be followed strictly. S'dllaber v. Robinson,
541.
15. In equity parol testimony is admissible to show that a conveyance abso-
lute on its face was in fact a mortgage. itsher v. Smith, 796.
16. A sale unler a truot deed is not affected by the voluntary absence of
the debtor in the confederate states. Martin v. Piaxson, 676.
VOL. XXVI.-106
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17. The mortgagor cannot maintain a writ of entry against the mortgagee
without showing a satisfaction of the mortgage. Jewettv. IHunlin, 795.
18. Suing the notes secured by a mortgage, and procuring judgment upon
them, without satisfaction, in no way affects the validity of the mortgage. Id.
19. The grantee of mortgaged premises is not liable at law to a mortgagee
upon his covenant with the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt. llizks v.
McGarry, 795.
20. A mortgagee with notice of the fraudulent discharge of a prior mort-
gage is not a bonafide purchaser. Ins. Co. v. Burnstine, 795.
MUNICIPAL BONDS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4; CORPORATION, 27;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 7, 8.
1. Where to a municipal bond which has several years to run, an over-due
and unpaid coupon for interest is attached, that fact does not render the bond
and the subsequently maturing coupons dishonored paper, so as to subject
them, in the hands of a purchaser for value, to defences good against the
original holder. Cromicell v. Countj of Sac, 602.
2. Municipal bonds payable to bearer are negotiable instruments, and sub-
ject to the same rules as other negotiable paper. Id.
3. Bonds and other securities issued by municipal corporations under legis-
lative authority, as a means of raising money on credit, by commercial usage
have obtained the quality and attributes of commercial paper, in respect to
their transfer. Knapp v. Ioboken, 140.
4. But ordinary corporation orders, warrants and certificates of indebted-
ness, arc not within this principle. If negotiable in form, they are negotiable
in character so far as to enable the holder to sue in his own name, but not so
as to exclude inquiry into the legality of their issue, or preclude defences
thereto. .d.
5. A municipal corporation has no power to invest its obligationswith the
,character and incidents of commercial paper, unless such power is conferred
by legislative authority, either express or clearly implied. Id.
6. If a municipal body has lawful pnwer to issue bonds dependent only
upon the adoption of certain p'reliminarv proceedings, such as a popular elec-
tion, the holder in good faith has a righi to assume that such prelifninary
proceedings have taken place, if the fact be certified on the face of the bonds
themselves, by the authorities whose primary duty it is'to ascertain it. County
of Marren v. Marcy, 796.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See ACTION, 3; ASSUMPSIT, 4; CONsTITI-
TIONAL LAW, 20, 21 ; HIGHWAY, 1 ; JOINT DMTORs, 2; L MITATIONS,
4; MANDAMUS, 1-3; MUNICIPAL BONDS; RAILROAD, 12.
1. On application for a mandamus against the common council, they may
call in question the constitutionality of an act which legislates them out of
office. The State v. Mayor of Neulark, 676.
2. The words "the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corpo-
rate powers," in the constitution, apply only to private, -not to municipal
corporations. Id.
3. The court, and not the legislature, is the tribunal which must determine
whether an object can be accomplished by general legislation. Ad.
4. The manner in which ward lines are run, being a matter which con-
cerns only those within the city, affecting exclusively internal affairs, a gen-
eral law must be framed to change such ward lines, special legistation. being
prohibited in such cases. id.
5. Where the authorities of a municipal corporation are proceeding to do
an act which is ultra vires and which will impose on a taxpayer an unlawful
increase of tax, he may file a bill in equity, in his own name, to enjoin the
act. Colburn v. Chattanooga, 191.
6. In such a case a court of equity has power to enjoin the issue of illegal
evidences of debt by the corporate officers. Id.
7. Corporate powers are to be strictly construed, and unless clearly given
in the charter or by statute, no authority exists in a municipal corporation to
issue scrip or warrants on the treasurer, in the form of promises to pay at a
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tutre day, for the purposc of paying the ordinary c-xpcnses of the munici-
pality. ('olburn v. Clmttn,rjet, 191.
8. Where an ordinance of a city authorizing a contract with a gas com-
pany, anl the issue to it of honds of the city, provided that the company
should " guarantee the said bonds and assume the payment of the principal
thereof at maturity." Ie'd, 1. That the guaranty embraced both the princi-
pal and interest of the hond- ; and, 2. That the ordinance contemplated two
undertakings by the company, one to the bondholder and one to the city.
Gai L;!ht Co. v. Clark, 278.
9. The duty on the part of a city opening a public street, carries with it the
right to determine the grade of the street and the manner of constructing it.
F 'l'nce v. New Haven, 141.
10. Where a city has taken land for a street and paid the damages legally
as-essed, it is not liable for an injury incidentally caused to the adjoining
land hy the grading iind working of the street in a proper manner. Id.
11. The doctrine that a municipality cannot he held liable for the conse-
quences of an act legally authorized, will not justify an invasion of private
property, Inman v. Tripp, 141.
12. A municipal corporation is not liable for the torti of its officers com-
mitted under color of their official capacity. Barbour v. Ellsworth, 341.
13. The object of the power granted to a city to prevent obstruction to
various easements of a public character is not to settle the title, which cannot
be tried by a municipal court under city ordinances. Beedier v. The People,
411.
14. The purpose of alleys is not as substitutes for streets, but as a means
of accommodation to a limited neighborhood for chiefly local convenience. Id.
15. Nothing can be treated as a punishable obstruction of an alley that
does not interfere with its accustomed uses. Covering it in by a roof is not
necessarily any obstruction whatever. Td.
16. Where the contractors in a forfeited paving contract, have left loose
sand lying within the limits of the unfinished work, it is their duty to remove
it, and the new contractors perform no tortious act in removing it. Detroit v.
Pacing Co., 676.
MURI)ER. See CnUxMAL LAW, "VI.
NAME. See TRADEMARK, 1-2. AGENT, 11 ; CHARITY, 7.
NATIONAL BANK. See TAXATIOn, 7, 8.
1. National banks are only exempted from state legislation so fur as it may
impair their efficiency to serve the government of the United States. Tioroas
v. I'htrinerns' Bank, 341.
2. A set-off may be pleaded in an action brought by a receiver of an insol-
vent national bank. liue v. 0l4 Vay, 476.
3. Where us,,rious interest is charged on a note or bill discounted by a na-
tional bank, the entire interest will, in an action on-the note or bill, be
adjudged forfeited. Id.
4. The action authorize I by sect. 30 of the National Banking Act of 1864, to
recover from the hank twice the amount of usurious interest paid, was within
the jurisdiction of the state courts. d.
NAVIGABLE STREAM. See RIPARIAx R GHTS.
NEGLIGENCE. See LANDLORD ANI) TnNANT, 2; MASTER AND SEnVANT;
RAILROAD, 1-5; 'rELEGRAr-II, 4.
1. A contractor is not liahle for the consequences of the negligence of his
sub-contractor. Brlqe, s v. Railway Co., 205.
2. The owner of a horse, lent without hire, is responsible for the negli-
gence of the borrower. JBr's Township r. King, 205.
3. F. approached a railroad crossing with which lie was perfectly familiar,
and with a manageable team. Ile drove by an open space, through which lie
had an extended view of the railroad, and stopped directly in front of awatch-
house of the railroad, which intercepted his view in the same direction. In
this position lie stood still for an instant, turning his head around as if look-
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jug for the train, and then whipped up his team to cross the track, and col-
liding with a passing train was killed. Ile was partially deaf, but did not
leave the wagon to look past the watch-house. Held, that he was guilty of
contributory negligence, and the court should have instructed the jury that no
damages could be recovered for his death. Railroad Co. v. Feller, 205.
4. The neglect of a railroad train to sound its whistle or ring its bell on
approaching a street crossing, does not relieve a party from the necessity to
use his senses-to listen and to look-before attempting to cross the railroad
track. Railroad Co. v. Houston, 278.
5. In order to maintain an action against a railroad company for injuries
received, it must be proved that the injury was caused by the negligence of
the defendant or its agents ; and it must not appear from the evidence that
want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the person injured directly
contributed to the injury. State v. Railroad Co., 542.
6. Negligence.cannot be imputed to the company merely from the fact that
a train may be behind the usual time. Id.
7. The onts probandi as to negligence is on the plaintiff, as it is the ground
of his action. Id.
8. The fact of negligence is for the jury to decide where there is evidence
legally sufficient to prove it, but in the absence of such evidence, it is the
duty of the court to withhold the case from the jury. id.
9. The doctrine of imputed negligence does not prevail in Ohio, and a child
of tender years, injured by the fault of another, is not deprived of a right
of action by reason of contributory negligence on the part of a parent or
guardian. Railroad Co. v. Alfanson, 604.
10. For a traveller upon a railroad train to pass from one car to another
while the train is in motion, may generally be considered an act of negli-
gence, but when a party, acting under a suggestion from the conductor,
attempts to pass from car to car, and is injured, lie will not be debarred his
right of recovery, merely because he undertook to comply with the con-
ductor's suggestion, and it is the province of the jury to determine both the
nature and effect of the conductor's remarks. Id.
11. The storage by a warehouseman of gunpowder in large quantities in
the same room with other goods liable to be ignited by a fire or explosion of
the powder, is negligence in itself, and where the fact is undisputed the court
may pronounce it negligence as matter of law. White v. Railroad Co., 783.
12. A railroad company or other common carrier keeping goods in its own
warehouse until called for, is a bailee for hire, and liable as a warehouse-
man under the above rule. Id.
13. Negligence may be the proximate cause of injury, although it is not
the sole or even the immediate cause. Id.
14. In an action for a personal injury against owners of an unenclosed lot
of ground within the limits of the city of Baltimore, upon which was a deep
excavation, left in a dangerous condition : Held, that the fact that persons
were in the habit of passing over the lot gave the plaintiff no right to do so.
2d. That a party has the right to use his land as he pleases, except as he
may be restrained by duty to- the public or to private individuals. Maen-
ner v. Carroll, 411. S
NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. See BILLs AND NOTES; MUIUCIPAL BoNDs,
2,3.
NEW TRIAL. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, I; Juity, 5 ; VERDICT, 1.
NOTICE. See ASSIGNMENT, 1 ; ATTORNEY, 7; BAILIENT, 1 ; BOND, 1 ; Com-
NON CARRIER, 14 ; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 7-8 ; MASTER AND SERVANT,
13; SURETY, 3; VENDOR, 2.
Record evidence of a conveyance operates as notice, and actual, visible
and open possession is equivalent to registry. Noyes v. flall, 478.
NUISANCE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
The clhim alleged that the surface of the defendant's land had been arti-
ficially raised by earth placed thereon, 'and that in consequence rain-water
falling on the defendant's land made its way through the defendant's wall
INDEX.
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into thi .ljoining house of the plaintiff, and caused substantial damage,
f14d, a good causc of action. Burdinun v. Railweg Co., 797.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See ATTACHMENT, 2; ATTORNEY, 6; CRIMINAL
LAw, 10; DEED, 5; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 12; STATUTE, 4; UNITED
STATES.
1. individuals ns well as courts must take notice of the extent of the
aithority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity.
1i,,wrins v. United States, 68.
2. The gaeranmeut is not bound by tile acts of its agents unless it mani-
J'e~tly appears that the agent was acting within the scope of his authority, or
that he had been held out as having such authority. Id.
3. An offiec is not vacant when there is a defacto incumbent. Harrison v.
Sinondi, 279.
4. Such incumbent must be ousted upon an information in the nature of
a quo w irranto, before the court will grant a mandamus to Zompel proceedings
for filling the office. Id.
5. All the country described by the Act of June 30th 1834, as Indian coun-
try, remains Indian country so long as the Indians retain their title to tile soil,
in the abh-nce of any different provision by treaty or by'act of Congress.
Bdtes v. Clirk, 279.
6. A military officer seizing liquors supposed to be in Indian countrywhen
they are not, is liable to an action as a trespasser. Id.
7. The difference between the value of the goods so seized, at the place
where they were taken and the place where they were returned to the owners,
is the proper measure of damages. Md.
8. Til rule that a public office is a public trust, and that all agreements by
a person holding such a station to control the business of tile government for
a pecuniary consideration to himself, are void as against public policy, is not
a local rule or peculiar to the law of this country, but a principle of morality
and of public policy enforced in all countries having an organized system of
law. Ozca..tn'an v. Armas Co., 626.
9. Such an agreement will not be enforced in the courts of this country
though the plaintiff relying on it is only an officer of a foreign government,
as to the law of which in regard to such matters there is no evidence. .d.,
ORDINANCE. See ACTION, 3; 31UNICIPAL CORPORATION, 13.
PARDON. See CoNztscA roN.
A pardon takes effect and is irrevocable when it has been signed by the ex-
ecutive, properly attested, authenticated by the seal of the state, and delivered
cither to the recipient, or to some one acting for him, or on his behalf. Ex
p irte Rema, 677.
PARENT AND CHILD.
There nunt be an express promise, or circumstances from which a promise
by the father can lie inferred, to hold him liable for necessaries furnished his
infant child. Murphy v. Ottenleimer, 342.
PARTNERSHIP. See BILLS AND N6TES, 8; CRIMINAL LAw, 28.
1. Sharing profits is sufficient to constitute one a partner. Lager v. Tup-
per, 478. 1
2. Agreement between A. and B. by which A. agreed to build five houses
forB. at actual cost, to be completed, &c., and the houses and the lots whereon
they were built to be sold, and tile proceeds of the sale to be divided between
A. and B.: Hid, that if this agreement could be construed as a partnership
at all, it was one for disposing of the houses and land, not for building them.
Bisbiee v. 1",fl, 205.
3. The intere-r of all the partners in the partnership property may be sold
under an execution upon a judgment confessed by a single partner, in the firm
name and for a firm debt. Roes v. Howell, 205.
4. One partner has no claim against another before a fiual settlement. But
such defence may be waived by going to trial without objection. Tolford v.
Toyl]brd, 742.
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5. An incoming partner may undoubtedly by agreement become liable for
debts contracted by the firm previous to his entering it, but the presumption
of law is against any such liability. Kountz v. lHolthouse, 742.
6. A retiring partner remains liable tbr all the existing debits of the firm,
to the same extent as if he had not retired. Rawson v. Tayulor, 412.
.7. The sole survivor of a firm may assign a promissory note payable to the
late firm by endorsement. Johnson v. Berlizheinzer, 343.
8. After the dissolution of a firm by the death of a partner, one surviving
partner has no implied power to bind another by a note given in the name of
the late firm, even for an acknowledged indebtedness accruing before the
firm's dissolution. Matteson v. Nathnson, 412.
9. The legal title to the realty or personalty of a firm.is held by the heirs
of a deceased partner, as trustees, for the equitable purposes of the firm.
Merritt v. Dickeg, 478.
10. The surviving partner of a firm is entitled to the possession of thepart-
nership assets, and cannot be dispossessed except for nisconduct. Id.
11. A partner's death dissolves the firm, and a court of equity has no power
to enforce a partnership agreement after such dissolution of the firm by the
partner's death. Roberts v. Kelsey, 797.
12. Where an agent of a firm, with fle assent of one partner, assigned a
demand due the firm, to apply on, a debt against himself and the assenting
partner: Held, that the person owing the demand could not contest the valid-
ity of the assignment without producing evldence that the other partners did
not acquiesce in the transfer. Kuhl Y. Tlompson, 797.
13. An indebtedness to be available as set-off against the assignee of a
demand, must have accrued before the assignment. Id.
PASSENGER. See CoMMoN CARRIER, 1-3; NEGLIGENCE, 9, 10: RAILROAD,
2, 9-11.
PATENT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
1. Patentees or assignees in a suit for infringement, where the patent de-
scribed in the bill of complaint is introduced in evidence, are presumed to be
the original and first inventors of the described improvement. 1?oumer v.Simon, 68.
2. A licensee to use a patent having knowledge that the patentee's right
is in litigation, but the licensee not having been interfered with, cannot plead
that the invention was not new nor that the patentee was not the first inventor.
Jones v. Burnham, 235.
3. A mere variation in the form or shape of the instrument cannot be suc-
cessfully used to evade the monopoly. But where form is of the essence
of the invention it is necessarily material, and if the same object can he at-
tained by a machine different in form where that form is inseparable from the
successful operation of the instrument, there is no infringement. 1l'erner v.
King, 343.
4. It is necessary to an infringement that the arrangement which infringes
should perform the same service in substantially the same way. Id.
5. The interest in a patent to the transfer of which writing is necessary,
under sect. II of the Act of 1836, is an interest in the legal title of the pat-
ent. An equitable interest or an interest in the proceeds need not be in writ-
ing. Blakeneg v. Goode, 413.
6. Although a cause of action may relate to the subject-matter of a patent
right, it is within the jurisdiction of state courts, if it does not involve the
validity of the patent right. Id.
7. Rights secured to an inventor by letters patent are property which con-
sists in the exclusive privilege cf making and using the invention and of
vending the same to others to be used for the period prescribed by the patent
act. Paper-bag Marhine Co. v. Murphy, 798.
8. Devices in a patented machine are different in the sense of the patent
law when they perform different functions or in a different way, or produce a
substantially different result. Id.
9. A reissued patent must be for the same invention as the original patent.
Marsh v. Seynwur, 798.
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PAYMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 15; LtIMITATIONS, 9.
Payment is a question of fact. SlyJ v. --rearan, 798.
PERJURY. See CRIItXNAL L.Aw, ,'lI.
PER PETI'VITY. See CRARITY, 5.
PLEAI)ING. See ACTION. 8-li ( IMINAL LAW, 7-13, 29, 34; GUARANTY,
2; Ii,-EL, 6; TiovER. 1.
i. Tile decision of the court upon the isus of fact are conclusive on a bill
of review. B,3j]ington v. llarreq, 69.
2. A general demurrer mut lie overruled if the pleading demurred to con-
tain atny good ground to Sulplort it. Id.
3. 'file granting of a rehearing is always in tile sound discretion of the
court, and furnishes no ground of appeal. Id.
4. The replication nitist support and fortify the declaration. The plain-
tiff, where ai evasive plea i- filed, may re.-tate his cause with more particu-
larity, but he must not depart from any material allegation in tile declaration.
BaInk v. Jlendrickso,, 678.
5. A departure in pleading is a fault in substance, and may be taken ad-
vantage of by general demurrer. ."d.
6. An argumentative plea is good on general demurrer. An objection
of that kind could formerly be taken advantage of only by special demurrer,
ani is now available only by a motion to strike out. Id.
7. The rule that judgment on demurrer will be given against the party
whose pleading is first defective, applies only when the defect in the prior
pleading is in a matter of substance, such as would be available on general
demurrer. Id.
8. In a case where malice is the gravamen of the action, the petition will
be held bad on demurrer, if the facts as detailed in it show that there was no
malice, notwitlstanding it contains a general charge that defendant's acts
were wilful, malicious and oppressive. Dritt v. Snodgrass, 679.
9. The cause of action is determinable by the declaration. Haley v. 11ob-
son, 791.
10. A bill of particulars is not objectionable as introducing a new caiuse
of action, even though the plaintiff had no such cause in his mind as tile bill
states when lie comnmenced the action. Id.
11. In pleading a foreign statute, it must be set forth in substance. The
averment, "pursuant to the statute,,: without setting forth the substance
of the statute, is insufficient. Sat Lake XVat. Bank v. .ltndrickson, 671.
POISONS, Tna PosT MORTEM IMBIBITION op, 145.
POSSESSION. See BAILMENT, 4 ; V NDOR, 2.
1. Under a writ of possession the plaintiff must be so established in his
possession by the officer that any person entering upon him will be indiatable
for a forcible entry. lnhabitants of Undion v. Buyli.q, 678.
2. Where C. was in possession of land under a parol contract of sale, and
M. took from C.'s vendor a mortgage of the land, with knowledge of C.'s pos-
session, but in ignorance of his rights as purchaser, the mortgage was void as
against C. Canninghann v. Brown, 742.
3. If two coterminous proprietors establish a dividing line between their
premises, and actually claim and occupy the, land on each side of that line,
continuously, for twenty years, such possession is adverse, and confers title
by prescription. Bader v. Zeis", 742.
4. In ejectment, where there was a road along and over the land, and the
parties hal built fences, each on that side oni which his land lay, field, that if
the centre of the road was agreed upon as the true boundary, and each party
had claimed anim occupied up to tile fence maintained by him, for twenty years,
lie was precluded from claiming a different boundary. AdL
POST OFFICES AND POST ROADS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-3.
POWER.
A testatrix bequeathed a fund to her daughter for life, and after her death
amongst the oilier children of the testatrix, or their issue, in such parts as her
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said daughter should by deed or will appoint. mild, that the daughter's
power was exclusive and not distributive merely. In re Veal's Trusts, 206.
PRESS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
PRESUMPTION. See EVIDENCE, 14; PAnTNEnSuIir, 5.
Where several persons lose their lives by the same event, there is no pre-
sumption of law as to survivorship based upon age or sex, nor is there any
presumption that they all died at the same moment.. The law makes no
presumption, but leaves the survivorship to be determined by the evidence.
Newell v. Ridgway, 249.
PROHIBITION. See ADMXALTY, 8.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: See BILLS AND NOTES, 1; CONTRACT, 7;
CRIsNAL LAW, 5, 6; WITNESS, 3.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTRACT, 6; OFFIC ER, 8,9.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
A school law, providing that the board of directors ".shall have power -to
make and enforce all needful rules and regulations for the government, man-
agement and control of such schools and property as they shall think proper"
* * * A board of directors made a rule that no pupil should, during the
school term, attend a social party. Plaintiff, a pupil of the school, by the
permission of his parents, violated the rule, and was expelled from the school
for so doing. In an action against the directors to recover damages for the
expulsion ; Held, 1. That under the law, they had no power to follow the
pupils home and govern their conduct while under the parental eye; but 2.
As there was no malice, oppression or wilfulness on the part of the directors,
they were not liable in damages. Dritt v. Snodgrass, 679.
.QUARANTINE LAWS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 15-17.
QUO WARRANTO. See OFFICER, 3-4.
RAIROAD. See BAILMENT, I ; COMMON CARRIER; CORPORATION, 9; HIGH-
WAX, 2; MASTER AND SERVANT, 9-13; NEGLIGENCE, 3-12; RECEIVER, I.
1. While unusual speed of railway trains does not of itself constitute
negligence, yet it may be considered with other circumstances in determining
the degree of care exercised. Artz v. ailroad Co., 69.
2. A railway company is liable for the malicious and criminal acts of their
employees toward passengers. McKinley v. Railroad Co., 69.
3. If a railroad crosses a common road on the same level, those travelling
on either have a legal right to pass over the point of crossing, and to require
due care on the part of those travelling on the other to avoid a collision. Con-
tinental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 142.
4. It. is the duty of the wagon to wait for the train. The train has the pre-
ference and right of way. But it is bound to give due warning of its approach,
so that tile wagon may stop and allow it to pass. Id.
5.. There is no legal obligation on the part of a railroad company to build
its bridges under public roads with an elevation so great that one of its em-
ployees standing upright on the top of a car will not be endangered. Baylor
v. Railroad Co., 604.
6. It is the duty of railroad companies to furnish safe machinery. Rail-
way Co. v. Asbury, 280.
7. Where a railroad company constructs and operates its road over its line,
under its charter, it cannot thereafter abandon the same, even though its
charter was merely permissive and not mandatory. Trust Co. v. Henning, 266.
8. Where Congress donates lands to a state to aid in building railroads,
there is a beneficial interest therein, vested in the state, and where such lands
are granted to a railroad company, by the state, in consideration that the
company shall build its road, and such grant is duly accepted, a valid coil-
tract is created, which is obligatory on the company, to complete its road ; and
compliance with such charter duty, and contract obligation, can be enforced
by mandamus. Id.
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RAILROAD.
9. A railroad company is not obliged to carry as baggage the trunk of one
who does not go by the :line train. Upu receiving the trunk of such per-
soi to Ie forwarded it i, receivel as frcight, and the duties and liabilities of
a eoutition carrier attach, with the right ii, a rea,,oable compensation for
tran-portation. Graffia v. Railroad C,,., 343.
10. Delivery to the passenger terminates a railroad company's liability for
a passenger's luggage. Pat 'h,'ilr v. llailwag Co., 799.
I1. A railway company ar(! lot insurer.s in respect of luggage placcd at a
pa.seuger's reque-t in the snile compartmient in which lie intends to travel.
Der~lim v. R, tilaj G ,., 799.
12. A city may permit a city railway track to be laid in its streets, with-
out coisuliaig or clnpensating the abutting proprietQrs who may own the
soil of the street. Bat the owner of the land is entitled to compensation for
the new burden inlipoqed on his estate. PRailroad Co. v. j~e.,l, 478 ; Rail-
row' C). v. Esf,,!e, 606.
13. The decrease in rental and market value of his lot are proper items
of damage, and .o atr the annoyances to business or faimily occupation caused
by the operation of the railroad. It.
14. Bait if the abuttmintr on ner does not own the soil of the street, the mere
laying of the track iii tile street is no legal injury. d.
RAPE. See CRtMINAL LA.w, VIII.
REAL ESTATE. See TExE.MENT.
RECEIVER. See NLTtONt, BANi, 2.
1. Tile court will authorize a receiver of a railroad company to make all
necessary repairs, and, if necessary, will charge tihe expense as a first lien on
time property. Hnovrr v. Railrat Co., 534.
2. An officer of a corporation, under whose management it has become
insolvent, is not a proper person to be appointed its receiver. JMcCullough v.
LwIn and Tru.,t ('o., 534.
RECORD. See NOTICE.
RECOUPME'NT.
There call be no recoupment in a suit on a sealed instrument. Price's E.r-
ctors v. Ry nold~s, 142.
REIIEARING. See "oar.R ADJUDICATION, 5 ; PLEADING, 1-3.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
I. Where the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States depends upon
the citizenship of the parties, it has reference to the parties as persons. A
petition for raemoval must, therefore, state the personal citizenship of the par-
ties and not their official citizenship, if there can be such a thing. .Araory v.
Amnorg, 142.
2. A petition for removal therefore, setting forth "t h at said plaintiffs, as
such erceutlors, are citizens of the state of New York," is insufficient. Ili.
3. Tile citizenship of the parties upon which the right of removal depends
meaus the citizenship of the parties at the time of the conwncu' at of the suit.
PJhwen. li:. Co. v. Pechaer, 142.
4. Tile legislation of Maiarcl 3,1875, in reference to the removal of causes,
did not repeal the second and third subdivisions of section 639 of the Revised
Statutes of the Uiiited States. 7t Xiw Jrsy Zinc Co., v. Trotter, 376.
REPLEVIN. See Usuity, 2.
1. A sheriff who seizes tie personal property of A. on an attachment
againt the property of B., and after sale delivers the actual possession to the
purchaser, is not a proper party defendant in replevin to recover the property
and damages for its detention. Moss v. Morris, 742.
2. Where tie plaintiff's goods have been commingled with like goods of
the defendants by the wrongful act of a third party, replevin will neverthe-
less lie therefor. Vilkinson v. Stewart, 742.
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RESCISSION. See CONTRACT, 5, 11 ; EQUITY, C; SALE, 4, 6, 12-15.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
1. A riparian owner has a right to moor a vessel of ordinary size along-
side his wharf for the purpose of loading or unloading, at reasonal,le times
and for a reasonable time; and the court will restrain by injunction the
owner of adjoining premises from interfering with the access of such vessel.
Collieries Co. v. Gibb, 206.
2. The grant of a franchise (as to maintain a boom in a river, within cer-
tain limits) cannot license a trespass by the grantee on lands of other per-
sons. Boom Co. v. Reilly, 679.
3. The purchaser of a trespasser's possession takes no right which the tres-
passer had not. Id.
4. The franchise to maintain a boom in a navigable river within certain
limits does not pass by a mortgage, by the grantee of the franchise, of land
within those limits of which he had no title. Id.
5. Riparian owners on the banks of streams in Wisconsin which are navi-
gable for the purpose of floating logs to market, my lawfully, until prohib-
ited by statute, construct in front of their land proper booms to aid in floating
logs. Id.
SALE. See EVIDENCE, 4, 5 ; M RTGAGE, 14-16 ; VENDOn.
1. The property in a chattel passes according to the intention of the parties.
Hires v. Hurf, 11.
2. Where there is a contract for tue sale of a smaller quantity of goods from
a greater mass of like quality (corn), which remains in the possession of the
seller, without selection or appropriation, the contract is executory, and the
property does not pass, unless there be a clearly expressed intention to make
the sale complete without further action by the parties. Id.
3. The conditions necessary to a completed sale discussed. Id., Note.
4. A party has no power to rescind a contract of purchase unless there is a
provision in it giving him the right to do so. Buckingham v. O.sborne, 143.
5. Where a contract of sale of personal property is inoperative under the
Statute of Frauds for want of delivery, a tender made afterwards, and an un-
conditional acceptance, have the same effect between the parties as if the
delivery had been made at the time of the sale. Id.
6. Where goods are obtained by means of a fraudulent purchase, the vendor
has a right to disaffirm the contract, so as to revest the property in himself
and to recover its value in an action of tort against the vendee. Dellone v.
Hall, 542.
7. It is not necessary that a contract of sale should determine the price in
the first instance: it may appoint a way by which it shall be thereafter deter-
mined. Cunningham v. Brown, 679.
8. Where, therefore, a contract for the sale of a village lot provided that
the price should be the same as the price of sale of the first lot which should
be sold in the vicinity, and lots adjoining the one in question were sold before
the action was commenced : Held, that the contract was thus rendered certain.
Id.
9. Time is usually of the essence of an executory contract for the sale and
subsequent delivery of goods, where no right of property in the same passes
by the bargain from the vendor to the purchaser. Jones v. United States, 500.
10. Where a contract is made to sell or furnish certain goods identified by
reference to independent circumstances, such as an entire lot deposited in a
certain warehouse, or all that may be manufactured by the vendor in a cer-
tain establishment, or that may be shipped by his agent or correspondent, and
the quantity is named ivith the qualification of "about" or "more or less,"
or words of like import ; the contract applies to the specific lot, and the
naming of the quantity is not regarded as in the nature of a warranty. Brow-
ley V. United States, 402.
11. But when no such independent circumstances are referred to, and the
engagement is to furnish goods of a certain quality or character to a certain
amount, the quantity specified is material and governs the contract. Id.
I N)EX.
SALE.
12. To constitute a rescission of a contract of sale for breach of warranty,
thne vendee's offLr to return the property should be unconditional, and should
asign the breach of warranty as the ground thereot C'inrclkll v. Price, 736.
16. It is generally a question or fact for the jury, whether an offer to return
gool sold, and rescind the contract, is made irit,n a eas,,,abl tinte. Md.
14. A continued use of the whole or a part of the property sold, after an
alleged offer to rescind, is inconsistent with the claim to have rescinded, or
at least strong evidence against it. Ml.
15. A vendor impliedly warrants goods sold by him without any opportu-
nity of inspection on the part or the buyer to be of a merchantable qually,
and if when the goods are dlivered to the buyer they are unmerchantable,
the buyer may return them 1 thout unnecessary delay and rescind the con-
tract; and if the goods on being returned to the vendor "are injured without
any fitult on the part of the buyer, such injury does not prevent a rescission
of the contract. Jjiqyer v. Boar-1, 743.
16. Where one sends for sale to a public market pigs which lie knows to
be infected with a contagious disease, but sells them expressly without war-
ranty it doe not amount to it representation that they were free from disease.
II'rd v. Hoebbs, 799.
SALVAGE. See ADMIRALTY, IV.
SAVINGS BI3NK.
A savings bank is an institution in the hands of disinterested persons, the
prolit- of which inure wholly to the benefit of the depositors, in dividends.
ai.tigton v. ,ttion,l Stwitgt, Bank, 605.
SE AIW.IIES ANI) SEIZURES. See CONSTITUTIONAi. LAW, 2, 3.
SERVANT. See MASTER AND SPISVANT.
1. A reporter and a city editor of a new-paper are la 'orers orservants within
the meaning of a statute making stockholders personally liable for the ser-
vice.; of laborers and servants of the corporation. l1urries v. Novil 97.
2. The test as to who shall be deemed a laborer or cervaut within such a
statute, cannot b limite-l to manual labor only, but must vary according to
the nature of the services in relation to the business. Id.
SET-OFF. See AoTtoN, 6 ; NATIONAL BANK, 2
The right of set-off in an action is governed by the law of the place where
the action is brought. Bank v. Heiningarty, 479.
SIIERIFF AND SHERIFF'S SALE. See ATTACHMENT, 2; JUDGMENT. 7.
I. A sheriff who owns stock in a corporation, has no such interest as will
disqualify him from cxecntia., process in a case to which the corporation is a
party. Ilirdvicl v. Ion,, 280.
2. A purchase by a corporation at execution sale is not void because the
sheriff conducting the sale is at the time a stockholder in the corporation. IR.
3. There is no implied warranty of title by a sheriff on a sale of property
under execution, ht when lie h:t information of an adverse claim, or such
information as would put one of ordinary prudence on inquiry in regard to
title, then it is his duty to take a bond of indemnity, which would protect the
owner and purchaser, or his duty at least to inform the bidders of the adverse
claim, and a fCilure to do one or the other would render him liable to the pur-
cl tser. Ilarrison v. S'ivzn,'s. 605.
SHIPPING. See ADiriRALY.
I. A description in a charter-party that a vessel is of a particular class is
not a continuing warranty. Frnch v. XetvYass, 800.
2. The imnplieJl warranty of seaworthiness into which the owner of a ship
enters with the owner of her cargo, attaches at the time when the perils of
the intended voyage commence; that is, when she sets sail with the cargo on
board for her port of destination. Cohen v. Daridtson, 70.
3 A clause in a bill of lading exempting from responsibility for "leak-
age" does not extend to damage caused by oil escaping from barrels. Tlrift
v. Youle, 71.
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4. Shipowners are in no case liable for any loss occasioned by collision be-
vond the amount of their interest in the colliding ship and her freight pend-
m,. except for Costs and interest by the way of damages in case of default
of payment and suit to recover the amount. Sparrout v. Azeryj, 206.
5. Nor are the stipulators, either for cost or value, ever liable for any de-
fault of their principal beyond the amount specified in the stipulation which
they gave, except for costs and interest by the way of damages in case of
their own default to make payment pursuant to the terms of the stipulation.
Id.
6. A cargo was shipped on board the plaintiff's ship under bills of lading,
which contained the following clause: "Three working days to discharge the
whole cargo, or 301. per day demurrage.1" The defendants, the endorsees of
the bills of lading, were prevented from completely unloading their portion
of the cargo within the lay days, because it lay at the bottom of the hold :
Held, that the defendants were liable for demurrage. Straker v. Kidd, 605;
Port 'us v. Watney, 605.
SLANDER.
1. In an action for charging plaintiff with havina burned his property to
defraud the insurers, proof of actual insurance is immaterial. Fbowler v. Gil-
bert, 413.
2. Charges made to plaintiff himself of the same slanderous nature as
those counted on, are admissible in evidence in aggravation of damages. Id.
3. Alleged frauds of plaintiff against third parties concerning agreements
regarding insurance, are irrelevant. Id.
4. The opinion entertained by a public officer as to the cause of a fire, is
inadmissible. Id.
r5. B. sued M. for charging him with perjury in an action pending before
a justice, to which action M. was a parry, giving at length the words used.
M. confessed the speaking of the words and pleaded in avoidance, that he
managed his own case before the justice, and that all he said was addressed
to the court in attempting to sustain his case, and for no other purpose, ard
was not in excess of his lawful right to indulge in fair criticism. Held, that
the jury should have been instructed to find for the defendant if the words
- spoken by him were pertinent and material to the question in controversy in
the action before the justice. Morgan v. Booth, 543.
6. Words. not actionable per se, spoken of the chastity of a woman, may
be shown to have been spoken in an actionable sense. Eininerson v. Alfarvel,
71.
7. That words, actionable per se, were spoken in the hearing of a third
person need not be alleged in the complaint, but must be proved on the trial,
in an action for slander. Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 6; TRUST, 4.
1. If one party be incapable of performance he cannot enforce it upon the
other. Luse v. Deitz, 543.
2. Where application for the specific performance of a contract for tne pur-
chase of land is made by the purchaser, courts of equity require that the terms
of the contract shall be fully stated, so that it may appear to the court to pos-
sess all the elements of fairness, mutuality and certainty in all its parts.
t Bridge Co. v. Bannon, 543.
3. But such strictness is not required as to the averments in the bill where
the complainants are strangers to the contract, and have not full and particu-
lar knowledge of its terms. Id.
STATUTE. See ACTION, I; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 22; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 12, 13; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2-4.
1. When a statute creates a new right or liability, and at the same time
gives a remedy, the remedy given is exclusive.. nniman v. Tripp, 143.
2. To save pending actions for statutory penalties, or pending prosecu-
tions for statutory offences, upon the repeal of the statute, an express saving
of all penalties incurred or offences committed under it, whether in the course
of prosecution or not, is essential. Rood v. Bailwy Ca., 280.
INDEX.
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3. The re-enactment of a statute after a judicial construction of its mean-
ing, is a legislative adoption of the statute as thus construed. Tuxbury's Ap-
pail, 343.
4. Statutes directing the mode of procedure of public officers where there
are no negative words rc.tricting the action are directory. l1arish v. Elwell,
543.
5. The constitutional amendment that prohibits the enactment of special
and local laws in certain cases, applies to laws regulating tho internal afflairs
of cities, as well as tho-e of counties. Sttc v. Parsons, 606.
6. A law, framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating
equally upon all of a group of objects, is rot a special or local law, but a gen-
eral law. d.
7. An act which, by its terms, is a supplement to di city charter, and de-
signed to regulate the internal affairs of such city, is a local act. State v.
Camden, 606.
8. The publication of an act in the hound volumes of session laws of the
year in which it purports to have been approved, verified by the secretary of
state, creates a presumption that it became a law pursuant to the require-
ments of the constitution. Bound v. Railroud Co., 743.
STREET. See 31UNICIPAL CoRORATIO N, 9-11, 14, 15 ; RAILROAD, 12-14.
SUCCESSION TAX. See TAx.
SUNDAY.
1. A statute being in force that every person who shall do any labor or
business, or work of his ordinary calling on the first day of the week, works
of necessity anti charity only excepted, shall be fined, S., a livery stable
keeper, let, in his ordinary business, a horse and carriage to be driven for
pleasure to a particular place, The hirer drove them to a different place and
returned them damagel ; whereupon S. brought trover against the hirer:
Held, that the action wonld not lie. Smith v. Rollins, 143.
2, SUNDAY CONTRACTs, WiEN VOID AND WHEN BINDINo, 281.
SURETY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 35; INFANT, 3.
i. Release by a creditor of part of the land mortgaged to him as security
for payment of a bond, does not discharge a surety in the bond if the remain-
der of the land is sufficient to indemnify him against loss. Saline County v.
]ine, 280.
2. In an action against a surety, the record of a judgment against his
principal, unless shown to be on account of matters connected with his guar-
anty, is inadmissible. Roberts v. Mattrrss Co., 413.
3. Where a party has given a bond to another to secure the faithful per-
formance of the contract of a third person, it is the duty of the obligee to
give reasonable notice to the guarantor of any defalcation on the part of the
contractor. Id.
4. Where a guaranty is subsequent to the contract between the principal
and the guarantee, and forms no part of the consideration thereof, it requires
a distinct consideration to give it efficacy as a collateral undertaking. Id.
5. But where a guaranty expressly referred to a previous agreement be-
tween the principal anti the guarantee, which was executory in its character,
and embraced prospective dealings between the parties, then the guaranty
purports upon its face and by necessary construction asufficient consideration.
Id.
6. A bonaflfde purchaser of a debtor's land from a fraudulent vendee,with-
out notice of the fraud, acquires an equity superior to that of a creditor. Bank
v. Teeters, 479.
7. A surety of the debtor, who takes a mortgage for his indemnity as such
surety, is to be regarded in equity as a bona fide purchaser, within this rule,
and will be protected to the extent of his liability as surety. Id.
8. It is no defence for the surety on a bail-bond that his principal has been
arrested and is being detained by the United States on a charge against him.
Commonwealth v. House, 544.
IND E X.
TAX AND TAXATION.
1. The constitutional provision that no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, does not require that per-
sons taxed by the law of the state shall be present, or isve an opportunity to
be present, when the tax is assessed against them. AlcMillen v. Ander.,on,
143.
2. Nor does it require that taxes shall be collected by a judicial proceeding.
Id.
3. A statute which gives the taxpayer a right to enjoin its collection, and
have the validity of the tax decided by a court of justice, is due process of
law. Id.
4. A purchaser of land, upon the descent of which a succession tax is due
under the Act of Congress incurs no personal liability to pay it. Wiilhdin v.
Wade, 343.
5. No one can be made liable for the payment of a share of the succession
tax due on the descent of a tract of land greater than his share in the land.
Id.
6. The Act of Congress does not authorize a sheriff, who has sold land and
collected the proceeds under an order of court in a partition suit, to pay the
succession tax due upon the descent of the land. l.
7. The rate of taxation upon the shares of a National Bank should be the
same or not greater than upon the moneyed capital of the individual citizen
which is liable to taxation. Adams v. .Nihtvle. 205.
8. The discretionary power of the legislature of the states over all these
subjects remains as it was before the Act of Congress of June 1864. The
plain intention of that statute was, to protect the corporations formed under
its authorityfrom an unfriendly discrimination against them of the power of
state taxation. Tiat particular persons or particular articles are relieved from
taxation is not a matter to which either class can (bject. d.
TELEGRAPH.
1. In case of a breach of contract, actual damages not being proved, nomi-
nal damages may be recovered. Bank v. Telegraph Co., 606.
2. In case of failure to deliver a telegraphic message, the company is only
liable for such damages as naturally flow from the breach of contract. Id.
3. If the telegraph company's default is made mischievous to a plaintiff
only by the dishonesty of a third person, the company cannot be made respon-
sible. Id.
4. A telegraph company delivered to the plaintiffs a message which was
not intended for them. The plaintiffs, who reasonably supposed that the
message came from their agents and was intended for them, acted upon it and
thereby incurred a loss : Hed, that the plaintiffs could not recover. Dickson
v. W7eegraph Co., 222.
TENANT FOR LIFE. See MINES AND) -, X , 1-3.
Tenant for life is bound to keep up improvements, unless destroyed by act
of God; but when they are so destroyed he has no right to cut timber to
.replace them. Miller v. Shields, 71.
TENDER. See SALEB, 5.
I. Tssu REQuIsITEs OF A VALID TENDER, 745.
2. Where mutual acts are to-be done by two parties at the same time, and
the right of each depends upon the performance of the other, either may ten-
der performance ofrhis part on condition of the simultaneous performance of
the otheir's part, and such tender will be good. But when one party is bound
to perform an act not dependtnt on any" nct of the other, a tender to be valid
must be without conditions. Story v: Akrewson, 56.
3. A tender of the amount due upon a promissory note payable at a bank,
made upon the condition that such 'note shall le surrendered, is sufficient, but
if the note be secured by a mortgage on real estate, P tender of the amant
upon the condition that such mortgage shall be released or cancelled, is in.&,f
ficient. Id.
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TENEMENT.
There may be several and distinct tenements in the same building, under
the same roof, as well where one is orer the other, as where one is beside the
other. Cincinnati College v. Ycrtmnan, 607.
TIME. See SA.LE, 9.
TITLE. See JUDICIAL SALE, 1 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 13, SHERIFF, 3:;
VENDOR, 3.
TORT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 39, 40; INFANT, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIOIT, 12; SALE, 6; UNITED STATES, 2.
1. Torts arising from breach of contract discussed. JNoto to Dickson v.
Telegraph Co., 227.
. 2. Evidence in civil actions, quasi criminal, discussed. Note to Kane v.
llbernia Ia. Co., 302.
TRADEMARK.
i. The use of party's own namn cannot be enjoined, unless fraudulent.
Carnichd v. Latimer, 144.
2. A. manufacturer has a right to label his goods with his own name or that.
of his mill, if no fraudulent purpose is intended, Id.
3. A court of equity will never grant its protection to a trademark which
expresses a falsehood as against one which expresses the truth. Heliobbld v.
Helinbold Manufacturing Co., 169.
4, General words cannot be appropriated as trademarks; and when, there-
fore, a man uses them in connection with his owfi name, the latter simply
identifies his goods and is the only distinctive feature- of' the trademark. -d.
5. In such a case the right to use his name is a personal.right and does not
pass to his assignee by an adjudication in bankruptcy. .d.
6. A trademark, consisting of a word and symbol, arbitrarily assumed,
may be lost by non-use. , Blackwell v. Dibrell, 516.
7. If an equivalent 'trademark is, without any knowledge of the first one,
originated and devised by another person during the period of such disuse,
for use at a particular place, or for a commodity of a particular region, that
other person may thereby acquire a right of exclusie use in the second trade-
mark, at such place, opi such product, and may enjoin -the general use of the
first trademark. Id.
8. If the second trademark, during such period of disuse, acquires a pecu-
liar gbographical and commercial signification, so that the use of the original
one, as an arbitrary device, would operate to deceive and defraud the public,
a court of equity may enjoin against the use of the first trademark. Id.
TRESPASS. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 41 ; OFFICER, 6 ; RIPAnIt. RIGHTS,
2, 3.
TRIALS. See EVIDENCE, 11, 12; EXTRADITION; JURY, 1-2; VERDICT, 3.
1. Where a jury is waived, and issues of fact submitted to the court, with a
request to have the conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions
of law, a question as to the sufficiency of the evidence apon which findings of
fact werer made can 'only be raised by a bill of exceptions. Ralston v. Adrn'r
of Kohl, 207.
2. It is error for a judge before whom a case is tried to leave the court-
room.whilst the cause is being argued before the jury. The argument of a
cause is as much a part of the trial as hearing the evidence, and the parties
are entitled to have the judge present. 1feredith v. The People, 344.
3. Although there may be some evidence in favor of. a party, yet if it is
insufficient to sustain a verdict, the court is not bound to submit the case to
the jury. . 'Herbert v. Butler, 800.
TROVER.
1. A wagon belonging to R. was placed by him in the hands of B. for sale.
Subsequently E. made an assignment f'or the benefit of creditors to H. Tro-
ver was after this brought for the wagon against B. by "E., trustee for H."
.l el, that the assignment gave title to H., and that the action was impro-
perly brought in the name of E. Meyers v. Briggs, 207.
INDEX.
TROVER.
2. If the owner of an article of personal property delivers it to another to
sell, the latter has no right to deliver it to his creditor in pa ment of his own
pre-existing debt ; and if he does so, the owner may maintain trover against
the creditor without a previous demand. Rodick v. !oburn, 800. " See AGrNT,
5-7.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See CHARtITY, I; EXECUTOR, 4-6; FRAVD, 2;
GIFT, 2.
1. The question how far one trustee will be held personally liable for the
acts of his co-trustee, discussed. Wilcox v. Bates. 280.
2. Hostile feelings between trustee and cestui que trust are not cause for
removal where the duties are merely formal and ministerial, and no neglect
of duty or misconduct is established against the trustee. McPherson v. Cox,
544.
3. Where the cestui que trust of real estate has an absolute interest without
any control in the trustee, the former may, as a general rule, alien his estate.
Where the eestui has been in possession a long time, the (ourt may direct a
jury to presume a conveyance from the trustee to perfec: the title, or may
itself act upon the same presumption. Read v. Power, 561.
4. But where the legal title is in a trustee, though only for a naked trust
to couvey, a purchaser from the cestid que trust i-zill not, in the absence of an
express agreement to accept the equitable title only, be compelled, on a bill
for specific performance, to accept the title from the cestud unless it is per-
fected bv a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee. .d.
5. One who gives a deed of trust upon land cannot afterwards make any
agreement concerning the same to the prejudice oh' the title conveyed by the
deed. Sim.; v. Field, 680.
6. A trustee cannot deny the title of his beneficiary. Railroad Co. v. Du-
rant, 72.
TUG. See ADMIRALTY, 3, 9.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. See DEED, S. 9: WILL, 7.
UNITED STATES. See CONFISCATION ; FRAUD. 1 ; OFFICER, 1, 2.
1. The Act of Congress of June 2d 1862, requiring contracts for the
government to be in writing, is mandatory. Clark v. United Sltates, 344.
2. The government is not responsible for tei laches or'the wrongful acts
of its officers. Hart v. United States, 344.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See ADMIRALTY, 8 : CORPORATION, 8 ; COURTs.
5, 6 ; NATIONAL BANK, 4; PATENT, 6.
1. Section 1005 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the court to allow an
amendment of a writ of error when the statement of the parties thereto is
defective. The right to amend is in its discretion. Pearson v. Yicadall, 207.
2. To give the court jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to show that a federal
question might have arisen, unless it is further shown, that it did arise and
was applied by the state court to the case. Hrger v. Pceople ol. Cdlibrnau,
207.
3. It is not necessary that the record of a judgment should be authenticated
in the mode prescribed by the Act of Congress to render the same admissible
in the courts of the United States : the ])istrict Court of the United States,
even out of the state composing the district, is to be regarded as a domestic
and not a foreign court. Turnbull v Paylson, 207. See Lis PENDENS, 1.
4. A judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States has the
same lien on the lands of the debtor within the district, that is given to a
judgment of the state court within the limit of its territorial jurisdiction.
Lawrence v. Beler, 480.
UNSOUND MIND. See INSANITY, 4.
USURY. See NATIONAL BANK, 3, 4.
1. If a new security includes sums for unpaid usurious items, it is to that
extent without consideration and liable to abatement. Gardner v. .Afattcso:,
680.
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USURY.
2. In replevin against the mortgagee of chattels who has seized them for
non-payment, the mortgagor may show that the notes secured by the mort-
gage are in part made up of usurious items. &ardner v. Miattesrn, 680.
VARIANCE. See AGENT, 10; ASSUMPsIT, 2.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; JUDICIAL SALE;
SALE; SURET , 6, 7.
1. A person who, having discovered a flaw in a title to land, purchases the
title for speculation, with a view to ousting the possessors, who claim to
be the real owners, is not a bonaefid purchaser. Manner v. isson, 544.
2. Possession by a man or his tenant is notice of the title, equitable as well
a legal, under which he claims the property. -id.
3. The kind or quality of title a purchaser is bound to accept from a ven-
dor, discussed. Note to Read v. Power, 563.
4. A vendor may waive his lien by acts as well as by express stipulations.
Ander.on v. Griffith, 607.
VERDICT.
1. Where the verdict is deemed by the court excessive,.it may impose upon.
the succes3fal party the alternative of accepting a reduced amount, or of nb-
mitting to a new trial. -Vol v. Railroad Co., 72.
2. Special verdicts should be positive, direct and intelligible answers to
single, direct and plain questions. Carroll v. Bohan, 414.
3. In an action de.loids ob7portatis, where defendant claiming under a chat-
tel mortgage, sets up an equitable counter-claim for reformation of the mbrt-
gage so as to make it cover a certain part of the goods in dispute, it is imper-
ative that the equitable issue be first tried ; and the two issues should not be
tried indiscriminately by i jury. Id.
4. To the question, whether the parties intended the mortgage to cove- the
mortgagor's entire stock of goods, the jury answered, as to the plaintiff, yes;
as to the defendant, no. They also answered another question affirmatively
upon a certain hypothesis, giving no answer to it upon any other hypothesis.
Hdd, that the verdict was insufficient.; and a judgment upon it was reversed
for that reason. d.
5. The affidavit of a juror cannot be used to inipench the verdict of a jury
of which he was a member. Lucas v. Vannon, 608.
6. After the delivery of the verdict, -the judge told the jurors that they
were discharged ; but immediately thereafter, before they had left their seats
or communicated with any one, he called their attentionto imperfections in
the verdict, and put it into the form which the jurors affirmed they intended,
and, as amended, it was signed by the foreman, and declared by the jury to
be their verdict : ld, no error. Swing llacdne Co. v. Heller, 744.
7. The court will not permit a verdict to stand which appears to be the
result of passion or prejudice. McKinley v. Railroad Co., 69.
VESSEL. See AnxutAxrT ; RIrActAN RtoTs, 1.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. See EQuITY, 15; HUSBAND AND WIFE,
15, 16.
TiE SUBJECT AND CASES DsIeUtssi., 1, 73.
,VOTES AND VOTERS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5 LEECTION.
WAGES. See SERVANT.
WAIVER. See P.nrNasnsuv, 4; SALE, 5; VENDoB, 4.
WARE ItOUSEMAN. See Co,ttoN CAREIER, 8; NEGLIGENCE, 11, 12.
WARRANTY. See Ji-rDcr.r, SALE, 3; SALE, 10-16; SHERIFF, 3; SHIPPINa,
1-2.
1. Subsequently-acquired lands pass under a grant with warranty. Broad-
well v. Phillips, 608.
WASTE. See MINtxs, 3; TENANT ron LiFE.
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WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
1. Land bordering on tide-water was platted into house-lots, some of whicha
extended below low-water mark, all the lots being defined sioreward by :-
fixed line, outide of which no lots were platted. Conveyance of these lots
was made, and subsequently a harbor line was fixed by the state, running in
front of the lots. 1[ld, on a trustee's bill for in.-tructions : 1. That the fee
of the soil below high-water mark'was in the state; 2. That the estallish-
ment of a harbor line was permission given by the state to fill out to it ; 3.
That a grantee of a lot touching tide-water who lills out to the harbor line
holds the filled land, not under his gratitor, but directly from the state; 4.
That the land between high-water mark and any lot not touching high-water
mark, with the right to fill to the harbor line, did not pass by the conveyance
made. Bailey v. Burges, 144.
2. In controversies between mill-owners as to the flow of water, a decree
which attempts to fix definitely the lower proprietor's rights, unaffected by
the corresponding rights of the upper, is erroneous. Jkoxsie v. lIox.sie, 4,t6.
3. In such controversies the process of injunction, being susceptible of
abuse from the difficultv of laying down any precise rule, should seldom be
resorted to. Id.
WAY.
Only a clear, practical necessity warrants the taking of private property for
a private road. It is only justifiable where no other way of access to the ap-
plicant's land can be found. People v. Richards, 680.
WHARF. See ADIttRALTY, 5; RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 1.
WILL. See DEED, 8, 9 ; INSANITY, 3; LIMITATIONIS, 10.
1. No presumption of an intent to die intestate as to any part of his pro-
perty is allowable, when the words of a testator's will may fairly carry the
whole. Gien v. 1iltonl, 344.
2. An apparent general intent to make by his will a complete disposition
of all a testator's estate cannot control particular directions plainly to the
contrary. Ad.
3. Such a general intent is of weight, however, in determining what was
intended by particular devises or bequests that may admit of enlarged or lim-
ited constructions. Id.
4. When a will directs conversion of realty only for certain purposes which
are limited, for-example, for the payment of particular legacies, and follows
the direction by a bequest of the residue of personal estate, the conversion
takes place only so far as the proceeds of the sale are needed to pay the lega-
cies prior to the residuary one, and the girt of the personalty will not carry
the produce of the sale of the lands in the absence of a contrary intent plainly
manifested. Id.
5. A general direction to sell and apply the proceeds indiscriminately to
the payrqent of debts and legacies operates as a conversion out and out. Id.
6. A will is not necessarily void for the testator's intoxication. If the act
which the testator does, is one which his intoxicdtion does not prevent him
from -doing with comprehension, it cannot of itself avoid it. Pierce v. Pierce,
744.
7. The presumption of undue influence from the retention of a will uncan-
celled by a testator, is no more significant than such retention would be in
case of intoxication. Id.
8. The question of the effect of intoxication upon the person's capacity-is
not a scientific question to be determined by experts, but one within common
observation, depending on the facts of each case. ld.
9. Though the will of a testator may have been executed in one state, yet,
if he die while domiciled in another, the law of the latter must e applied in
determining whether such will has been duly executed. Jtterson v. Lmn-
sam, 72.
10. The execution having been attested by but one witness, testator after-
wards, at a different place, and in the absence of such witness, executed ant
endorsement upon the back of such will, reading, "The wvithin is tine basis
on which I desire to have my affairs disposed of, should no other will i
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made by me," which endorsement was attested by another witness, to whom
its contents had been made known, and i.. .ignatures to such will exhibited,
by such testator : Held, that it had not hcen executed in the presence of two
witnesses ; alIo, that it can not he establibed by parol evidence, that the sig-
nature of such witness, to such endorsement, was intended by the testator,
and executed by such witness, as an .attesting of such will. Pattei'son v. lan-
som, 72.
11. The probate of a will was contested on two grounds : want of capacity
and undue influence : Jhd, that the declarations of the deceased were con-
petent to go to the jury on both issues. Lucas v. Cannon, 608.
12. A statute in force providing that " whenever any child shall be born
after the execution of hM4 ftther's or mother's will, without having any pro-
vision made fbr him in such will, he shall have a right and interest in the
estate of hii father or mother in like manner as if the father or mother had
died intestate." A testator, by his will, gave a bequest* of ^20:)0 in trust,
the income to be used for his daughter unni twenty, or until married, then
the trust fund to said daughter. In case, however, of her death under twenty
or unmarried, the sum so held in trust, together with the accumulated inter-
est thereon, was bequeathed in equal shares to her brothers and sister-c then
living. More than a year after the execution of the will a son was born to
the testator, for whom no provision was made in the will except the above
described contingency : Ad, that the provision was not such as was con-
templated by the statute, and that the son was entitlhd to share in his father's
estate as in case of an intestacy. Potler v. Brown, 208.
WITNESS. See CRIMINAL LAw, 4, 5, 21, 22 ; EVIDENCE, 3, 17, 18.
1. At common law a party to a suit is a competent witness to prove the
contents of a trunk or package, which by other testimony is shown to have
been lost or destroyed under circumstances that render some one liable for the
los%, and section 1079, Rev. Stat., was intended to do no more than to
restore in the Court of Claims the common-law rule excluding parties as wit-
nesses, which had been abolished by the Act of July 1st 1864 ; and, hence,
claimant in this case was competent to prove the contents of a package of
government money taken from his official safe by robbers. United Qtates v.
Clark, 608.
2. If the state summon a witness and refuse to introduce him on the trial,
the court cannot compel his introduction, as the law officer of the state can
make out his case by any testimony he sees fit to introduce. Eason v. T2e
,YSate, 313.
3. A witness, as such, cannot have an attorney; and though an accom-
plice may act by advice of his attorney on the question whether he will be-
come a witness for the prosecution, when he once becomes such a witness, the
relation of attorney and client ceases. Might v. 1iindskopjf, 272.
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